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The United States has participated in overseas humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief (HADR) efforts since its inception. Today, the principal government agent 
responsible for HADR responses is the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), which works closely with the U.S. Department of Defense, including Marine, 
Navy, Air Force, and special operations forces to provide logistical support. Air Force 
special operations forces (AFSOF) are an especially useful HADR asset, given their 
speed, organic command and control, and unique mission sets. Despite this, AFSOF is 
often overlooked as a rapid responder in HADR operations. This thesis investigates the 
use of AFSOF as a rapid responder through two case studies: the 2004 HADR operation 
following the earthquake and tsunami in Southeast Asia and the HADR operation 
following the 2013 super typhoon in the central Philippines. In both cases, AFSOF 
provided critical support in the hours and days after these disasters, and helped pave the 
way for more sustained efforts undertaken by other U.S. and international responders 
over time. To improve AFSOF’s capabilities as a HADR force, this thesis recommends 
creating one set of HADR definitions for the U.S. government, improving AFSOF’s and 
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A. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, DISASTER RELIEF, AND THE DOD 
In a letter written to Jean-Baptiste Leroy in 1789, Benjamin Franklin proclaimed 
that nothing is certain except death and taxes.1 While there is truth to this statement, it is 
also true that disasters are another certainty that can join the small list of life’s 
guarantees. The United States has a history of providing humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief (HADR) to foreign lands dating back to its earliest days as a nation, 
including relief to Venezuela following an earthquake in 1812, humanitarian support to 
Cuba combating yellow fever after their 1898 War of Independence with Spain, and 
assistance to the French government after flooding in 1910.2  
Today, the United States responds to these events primarily through the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID). As part of this response, the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) is a critical partner that helps fill gaps in disaster 
response. The DOD has several organizations that are viable rapid responders for a 
variety of overseas disasters, particularly Marine expeditionary forces (MEF), Air Force 
contingency response groups (CRG), and special operations forces (SOF).3 
Among these responders, SOF is particularly well suited for HADR missions 
because it has “the ability to deploy rapidly and operate effectively in austere 
environments with little or no infrastructure.”4 Aviation is especially useful for HADR 
because of its capability to move people and cargo to just about any location on earth, 
                                                 
1 Albert Smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 10 (London: Macmillan, 1907), 69.  
2 Committee on International Disaster Assistance, The U.S. Government Foreign Disaster Assistance 
Program (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1978), 7–8. 
3 Daniel Haulman, Wings of Hope: The United States Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift Operations 
1947–1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998); A. Timothy Warnock, 
Short of War: Major USAF Contingency Operations 1947–1997 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and 
Museums Program, 2000); United States Marine Corps, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Relief: Operation Damayan Support to the Republic of the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan in November 
2013 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 2014); John Jumper, “Rapidly Deploying 
Aerospace Power: Lessons from Allied Power,” Aerospace Power Journal (Winter 1999).  
4 Department of Defense, Support to Foreign Disaster Relief (GTA 90-01-030) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2011): 10–1; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-05 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), III–17. 
 2
and Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) comprise some of the nation’s most 
versatile aviation-based personnel and equipment. Specifically, AFSOF brings to the 
HADR response a significant level of speed, organic command and control (C2), and 
unique mission sets (see Appendix A), that make AFSOF ideal to support foreign rapid-
onset natural disasters.  
However, the U.S. government has not fully used AFSOF as a force for HADR 
operations. Examples where the U.S. government could have better leveraged AFSOF’s 
capabilities include the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Southeast Asia, the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti, and the 2013 super typhoon in the Philippines. This thesis aims to 
identify instances where AFSOF can provide the best assistance during a rapid-onset 
natural disaster HADR operation, how best to prepare AFSOF for these missions, and 
how to inform AFSOF’s military and civilian partners better of its strengths and 
capabilities for these missions. 
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis draws from academic and policy literature on HADR operations, as 
well as current military doctrine, and interviews with key military and civilian leaders 
with HADR experience to summarize the history of the U.S. role in HADR. The research 
delineates the processes whereby the United States becomes involved in HADR missions, 
details the challenges in conducting these operations, and finally identifies the areas 
where DOD and AFSOF, in particular, can provide assistance.  
From this summary, the thesis then examines two recent HADR missions: 
Operation Unified Assistance, which was a multinational response to the December 2004 
earthquake and tsunami that affected multiple nations along the Indian Ocean coastline, 
and Operation Damayan, which provided relief following the 2013 Super Typhoon 
Haiyan that swept across the central Philippines. In both cases, AFSOF was used to 
varying degrees of success. These case studies identify how AFSOF’s attributes 




This thesis identifies whether AFSOF has the ability to fill critical gaps to 
providing relief, particularly in the first hours and days following a disaster, and if it can 
create the conditions for larger forces to deploy to austere and devastated regions. 
Specifically, AFSOF is a force multiplier and provides speed, organic C2, and unique 
mission sets that may significantly improve the U.S. government’s response to rapid-
onset foreign disaster relief. Since AFSOF is designed to support short-notice special 
operations missions, as a dynamic organization, it can easily adapt to specific needs. This 
makes AFSOF a flexible entity well designed to meet the unpredictable requirements 
after a disaster strikes. In addition to these attributes, AFSOF maintains relationships 
around the world with various militaries and governments that prove extremely valuable 
during disaster responses. These connections can allow AFSOF to bridge gaps early in a 
HADR response.  
Despite AFSOF’s inherent HADR capabilities, there are limitations to what 
AFSOF can accomplish after a disaster strikes. Specifically, AFSOF lacks the ability to 
sustain long-duration relief efforts. AFSOF’s strengths are to provide a rapid responding 
force that can provide critical capabilities in the immediate hours and days after a disaster 
strikes and to prepare the way for other DOD and humanitarian organizations to sustain 
efforts over the long haul.  
Finally, AFSOF’s limited interaction with USAID and with other DOD rapid 
responders has affected its ability to apply its unique characteristics during HADR 
operations. AFSOF lacks a comprehensive understanding of the needs of the 
humanitarian community and, similarly, the humanitarian community seems to lack a 
clear understanding of AFSOF capabilities.  
To address these problems, the thesis concludes by proposing ways that AFSOF 
can better prepare for HADR missions and improve interoperability with its U.S. 
government and DOD partners. Specifically, this thesis provides four recommendations 
for improving AFSOF’s role during HADR operations. First, align DOD’s HADR 
doctrinal definitions with those of USAID. Second, improve DOD and USAID 
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interoperability. In particular, AFSOF should coordinate with USAID’s Office of Civil-
Military Cooperation to improve each other’s understanding of capabilities. Third, foster 
a habitual training relationship with the humanitarian community through the conduct of 
tabletop exercises. Finally, implement the AFSOF Disaster Response Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) presented in Appendix B of this thesis. 
D. THESIS OUTLINE 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II provides an overview of U.S. HADR 
operations, including a brief history of U.S. involvement in overseas disasters, the key 
government organizations responsible for HADR, and the process for U.S. participation 
in humanitarian crises. Chapter III offers a case study of Operation Unified Assistance 
and the efforts of AFSOF in Thailand and Indonesia following the December 2004 
earthquake and tsunami. Chapter IV investigates Operation Damayan, the relief operation 
after the 2013 typhoon that battered the central Philippines. Chapter V offers conclusions 
and provides recommendations for improving AFSOF participation in HADR operations. 
Appendix A presents the unique mission sets of AFSOF through descriptions of Air 
Force Special Operations Command’s (AFSOC) eight core missions. Lastly, Appendix B 
presents a CONOPS for future relief efforts. This CONOPS establishes a path to improve 




II. UNITED STATES’ HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND 
DISASTER RESPONSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower said, “Plans are worthless, but planning is 
everything. There is a very great distinction because when you are planning for an 
emergency you must start with this one thing: the very definition of ‘emergency’ is that it 
is unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the way you are planning.”5 
Eisenhower’s quote points to the difficult nature of preparing for the unexpected. Yet, 
despite this challenge, the U.S. government still needs to take prudent steps aimed at 
preparing for the unknown of emergencies.  
This chapter focuses on the role of the United States in rapid-onset natural 
disaster relief, specifically to a foreign disaster. It begins by offering a brief history of 
U.S. HADR operations, along with an overview of U.S. agencies responsible for HADR. 
The second section delineates the process whereby the United States becomes involved in 
HADR operations, including the involvement of the U.S. military. The third section 
details some challenges in conducting HADR operations, and the final section provides a 
summary and conclusion of the chapter. 
We also examine the relationship between USAID and the DOD in HADR 
operations. Within this relationship, we identify a critical gap in U.S. HADR assistance, 
specifically the rapid deployment of DOD personnel and resources within the first hours 
or days of a HADR incident. AFSOF have relevant training, manpower, and equipment to 
overcome this gap and shorten the response time to alleviate suffering.  
                                                 
5 Dwight D. Eisenhower (speech, November 14, 1957), quoted in Department of Defense: Support to 
Foreign Disaster Relief (GTA 90-01-030) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011): 5–1. 
 6
B. UNITED STATES HADR HISTORY AND AGENCIES 
The United States has a long history of providing disaster relief to foreign 
countries that stretches back to the founding of the country.6 However, during the early 
days of the nation’s foreign disaster relief efforts, it was typical that the response came 
from private citizens, not from the government. A 1978 report from the Committee on 
International Disaster Assistance noted that, after a disaster struck a foreign land, it “was 
usually followed by public meetings in the United States, sponsored by chambers of 
commerce, boards of trade, and business firms. At such meetings, speakers pointed out 
the consequences of the latest disaster and special collections were taken.”7 Private 
citizens ensured that foreign populations received the assistance they needed; these 
actions set the precedent that the people of the United States would provide aid to other 
countries during times of need. 
The earliest recorded foreign disaster relief conducted by the U.S. government 
occurred in the midst of the War of 1812 against the British. The U.S. Congress 
authorized sending relief supplies to Venezuela after an earthquake struck the nation in 
March of the war’s first year.8 However, even after this authorization, the U.S. 
government rarely involved itself in HADR operations, relying on the civilian sector to 
be the primary conduit of aid to disaster areas.  
While the U.S. government initially did not take on the bulk of relief work, it did 
allow the U.S. military to use its unique capabilities that were missing in the civilian 
sector. During this period, “Congress did allow naval vessels to be used to transport 
private gifts” when there was no other way to deliver the aid.9 This event highlights the 
beginning of a longstanding relationship among the U.S. government, its military, the 
humanitarian community, and foreign nations working together to alleviate suffering. 
                                                 






Modern HADR policy can trace its roots to the post–World War II European 
Recovery Program, commonly referred to as the Marshall Plan. The plan, developed in 
1947, provided the multitude of Europeans affected by World War II with necessities like 
food and water, in addition to longer-term plans for redeveloping these countries.10 The 
European Recovery Program was an international venture; the many nations involved 
realized that a peaceful end-state required partnership.11 The plan also aimed to use 
humanitarian assistance and development aid as a bulwark against the advances of Soviet 
influences in Western Europe and to curtail the spread of communism.  
The Marshall Plan, which lasted from 1948 to 1952, was designed to be 
conducted in four one-year phases: the first phase was dedicated to providing food and 
tools to begin the recovery; the next phase focused on economic growth; the third phase 
aimed to economically integrate Europe with participating countries; and the final phase 
transitioned to an emphasis on security.12 The Harriman Committee report on the 
Marshall Plan summarized its motivations by stating:  
There is deeply rooted in the hearts of most Americans . . . a will and a 
wish to give whatever is possible to those who are in dire need of help. . . . 
We as a nation, who are enjoying comparative luxury, cannot in good 
conscience do otherwise. To withhold our aid would be to violate every 
moral precept associated with our free government and free institutions.13 
The humanitarian response of the Marshall Plan signified the importance of relief efforts 
following World War II, and set a precedent for U.S. involvement in HADR down the 
road.  
Building off the success of the Marshall Plan, President John F. Kennedy passed 
the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961 and, under Executive Order 10973, created USAID.14 
                                                 
10 Harry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and its Meaning: An Independent and Unbiased Appraisal 
of the Entire Record (Washington, DC: Governmental Affairs Institute, 1955), 4.  
11 Ibid., 6. 
12 Ibid., 37. 
13 President’s Committee on Foreign Aid, European Recovery and American Aid (Washington, 1947), 
17–22, quoted in Harry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning (Washington, DC: 
Governmental Affairs Institute, 1955), 306. 
14 United States Agency for International Development, “Who We Are.” accessed May 24, 2015, 
http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/usaid-history. 
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With this Executive Order, President Kennedy merged multiple foreign aid entities into a 
single organization with the goal of improving international development and 
maintaining this goal as a national objective.15 USAID became a critical arm of U.S. 
goodwill and foreign policy during the Cold War, providing not only humanitarian aid 
but also mentoring and other resources aimed at helping the developing world, which was 
particularly vulnerable to the spread of communist ideology.16 Today, USAID is still a 
single organization with multiple divisions dedicated to the development of foreign 
nations. See Figure 1. 
Figure 1.  USAID Organizational Diagram 
 
Source: United States Agency for International Development, Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2013 (Washington, DC: United States Agency 
for International Development, 2013), 65. 
                                                 
15 John F. Kennedy: “Executive Order 10973—Administration of Foreign Assistance and Related 
Functions,” Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, November 3, 1961, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58911. 
16 United States Agency for International Development, “Who We Are.”  
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USAID became its own independent federal agency on November 3, 1961, and 
“although a separate agency from the [Department of State] DOS, it shares certain 
administrative functions with DOS, and reports to and receives overall foreign policy 
guidance from the Secretary of State.”17 USAID’s website describes their role as, “the 
lead United States Government agency that works to end extreme global poverty and 
enable resilient, democratic societies to realize their potential.”18 Within the construct of 
USAID are multiple bureaus: the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian 
Assistance oversees HADR efforts for the U.S. government with its four primary 
objectives: prevention, response, recovery, and transition.19 See Figure 2.  
Figure 2.  USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian 
Assistance 
 
Source: United States Agency for International Development, Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance: Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2013 (Washington, DC: United States Agency 
for International Development, 2013), 65. 
                                                 
17 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Joint Publication 3-29 (Washington, DC: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), II-4.  
18 United States Agency for International Development, “What We Do.” accessed February 8, 2015, 
http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do. 
19 United States Agency for International Development, “Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and 
Humanitarian Assistance.” accessed February 19, 2015, http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-
are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance. 
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Within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance are two 
offices of significance for collaborating with the U.S. military for disaster relief 
operations: the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation and the Office of United States 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation has 
the primary mission of coordinating with the DOD and working on enabling unity of 
effort. The goal of this office is to “align development and defense and leverage the 
unique capabilities of both partners to achieve better development outcomes in pursuit of 
U.S. national security goals and national values.”20 The Office of Civilian-Military 
Cooperation works toward this goal through coordination at the combatant commands, 
through liaisons at the Pentagon, and through outreach training.  
The DOD uses a tiered approach in coordinating with USAID and establishing the 
military’s role in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), an umbrella term including 
foreign disaster relief.21 The Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for overall 
coordination of policy and funding.22 However, the development of policy is created by 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)): “within USD(P) the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) (ASD[SO/LIC]) is 
responsible for FHA policy and statutory programs with DOD.”23 This office coordinates 
with USAID’s Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation. The ASD(SO/LIC) is the primary 
office of coordination for foreign disasters and is responsible to:  
Coordinate DOD [foreign disaster relief] FDR operations with USAID, the 
Department of State, and other involved Federal departments and 
agencies; promote FDR collaboration among these departments and 
agencies. Represent the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) in 
discussions on FDR policy, strategy, and operations with other U.S. 
Departments and agencies, including USAID, and with foreign 
                                                 
20 United States Agency for International Development, “Civilian-Military Cooperation.” accessed 
June 4, 2015, http://www.usaid.gov/military.  
21 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, ix. 
22 Ibid., II-4. 
23 Ibid., II-5. 
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governments, international organizations (IOs), non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and members of the private sector.24 
In addition to policy, when there is a formal request of the DOD for HADR support, 
ASD(SO/LIC) validates the need requested by USAID, and identifies the DOD resources 
available to the HADR operation and competing demands on those resources.25 
C. RESPONDING TO A HADR INCIDENT 
In order for the United States to participate in a HADR mission, several criteria 
must be met. First, the affected nation’s government must request support via the DOS or 
be willing to accept assistance. The mobilization officially occurs through a disaster 
declaration cable, typically between the U.S. Embassy in the affected country and the 
host nation.26 Additionally, the United States only supports this request when:  
The U.S. Ambassador or Chief of mission to the affected country . . . 
declares a disaster when an event meets the following criteria: The disaster 
is beyond the ability of the affected country to respond . . . and responding 
is in the best interest of the United States Government.27 
Once a foreign nation makes a request, and it meets the United States’ criteria, 
USAID will begin to take the necessary steps to provide assistance.  
Within USAID, OFDA “is responsible for leading and coordinating the United 
States Government’s response.”28 OFDA assesses the situation and defines the process of 
providing relief. After a large-scale disaster, USAID may send a disaster assistance 
response team (DART) from within OFDA “to coordinate and manage an optimal United 
States Government response, while working closely with local officials, the international 
                                                 
24 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR), DOD Directive 5100.46, Washington, 
DC: Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2012, 5. 
25 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR), 5. 
26 United States Agency for International Development, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance: Annual 
Report for Fiscal Year 2013 (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 
2013), 67.  
27 Ibid. 
28 United States Agency for International Development, “Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.” 
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community, and relief agencies.”29 The DART consists of technical experts who 
prioritize the flow of humanitarian aid into the region affected. As organizations pour into 
the disaster area, the DART interfaces with these agencies, controlling the effort, to 
include operations involving the DOD. 
The DOD supports HADR operations under USAID/OFDA’s Humanitarian 
Coordination and Information Management Sector.30 Depending on the response gaps 
that exist, OFDA may request DOD assistance when the military can provide a unique 
service or the civilian response capacity is overwhelmed.31  
The authorization for the DOD to conduct HADR lies within DOD Directive 
5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, initially passed in 1964 and most recently re-signed by 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter on July 6, 2012. The 2012 version of this 
directive references President William Clinton’s 1995 Executive Order 12966 stating:  
The Secretary of Defense shall provide disaster assistance only: (a) at the 
direction of the President; or (b) with the concurrence of the Secretary of 
State; or (c) in emergency situations in order to save human lives, where 
there is not sufficient time to seek the prior initial concurrence of the 
Secretary of State, in which case the Secretary of Defense shall advise, 
and seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State as soon as practicable 
thereafter.32 
This policy enables the DOD immediate response authority when the situation 
requires unilateral humanitarian assistance—referred to as the “72 hour, life and limb 
provision.”33 Using these authorizations and criteria, the DOD provides USAID with a 
resource to bridge multiple gaps in response time and capability within HADR 
operations.  
                                                 
29 United States Agency for International Development, “Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.” 
30 United States Agency for International Development, “What We Do.”  
31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, II–7. 
32 William Clinton, “Executive Order 12966—Foreign Disaster Assistance,” Gerhard Peters and John 
T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, July 14, 1995, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. 
php?pid=51625.  
33 Department of Defense, Support to Foreign Disaster Relief, 2–6. 
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The DOD contains only a few organizations that are capable of bridging both the 
response and capability gaps in HADR operations. Specifically, MEF, Air Force CRG, 
and the various elements of SOF—particularly AFSOF—all provide the DOD with rapid-
responder options. Each of these organizations brings a unique set of capabilities to 
HADR missions.  
The capabilities of the MEF, and their subordinate element the Marine 
expeditionary brigade (MEB) or the smaller Marine expeditionary unit (MEU), are 
particularly useful for HADR missions. The Marine School of Advanced Warfighting 
defines the MEU, as a force “to provide combatant commanders with a rapid response 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief force capable of conducting military-to-
military training and civil action . . . and enabling operations in support of the Joint 
Force.”34 The MEU offers a credible sea-based support structure following a disaster by 
utilizing “reliable communications, sea/land based transportation, technical repair advice 
and basic life sustenance of food, water, and shelter.”35 These capabilities make the MEF 
a primary amphibious responder to crises and viable for operations beyond the littorals. 
The MEF offers additional capability by staging at sea and not creating an additional 
burden in the disaster zone. Furthermore, the Marines have equipment, such as the 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle, that they have used during HADR operations that can 
conduct recovery operations where many conventional boats are unable.36 The 
capabilities of the MEF have played vital roles in such HADR missions as Operation Sea 
Angel in Bangladesh 1991 following a super typhoon, and Operation Unified Response 
in Haiti in 2010 after their devastating earthquake.37 
                                                 
34 Maria McMillen, “MEU (HA/DR): Shaping the World with Civil Military Engagement” (thesis, 
United States Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, 2007). 
35 Dennis E. Granger, “The Marine Expeditionary Unit: A Limited Conventional Response Force—
Not a SOF Substitute” (master’s thesis, Naval War College, 1994). 
36 Glenn Goodman, “Developing the Marine Corps’ Amphibious Assault Vehicle Capability After 
EFV Cancellation,” Defense Media Network, November 14, 2011, http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/ 
stories/the-marine-corps-aav-and-acv/.  
37 Chris Seiple, “The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 1995); U.S. Joint Forces Command, USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti … Some 
Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force (Suffolk, VA: Joint Center for Operational 
Analysis, 2010), 13. 
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The Air Force contingency response wings, first created in 2005, constitutes “a 
multidisciplinary, cross-functional team whose mission is to provide the first on-scene 
Air Force forces trained to command, assess, and prepare a base for expeditionary 
aerospace forces.”38 The Air Force globally stations these groups to help prevent the 
stovepipe deployment of “engineers, communicators, medics, air field managers, security 
forces, airlift control elements, and so forth, often in advance of an established joint task 
force (JTF).”39 The CRGs provide the capability of “a multi-disciplinary team that would 
work together to be the first on-scene force to take control of an airfield, assess it, and 
prepare it for expeditionary air forces to arrive and begin to operate.”40 CRGs have 
participated in HADR missions, including the Pakistan earthquake of 2005 and Operation 
Unified Response in Haiti 2010.41 
In addition to these conventional elements of the DOD, SOF regularly deploy 
throughout the world as part of HADR missions, “providing medical services . . . and aid 
to communities devastated by natural disasters.”42 SOF lists FHA as one of its core 
activities in Joint Publication 3–05.43 The publication defines foreign humanitarian 
assistance as “DOD activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to 
directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger or privation.”44  
SOF capabilities hinge on their austerity, flexibility, and cultural sensitivity, 
which make them especially useful in HADR situations. Susan Marquis, a senior civilian 
official in the DOD and a Center for Public Management fellow at the Brookings 
Institution, contends in general terms that, “The flexibility and ingenuity of SOF have 
                                                 
38 Jumper, “Rapidly Deploying Aerospace Power: Lessons from Allied Power,” 5. 
39 Ibid., 4. 
40 Brian P. Mayer, “Contingency Response Groups: An Analysis of Maintenance Training” (master’s 
thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2011), 6. 
41 “621st Contingency Response Wing,” July 2, 2013, http://www.jointbasemdl.af.mil/library/ 
factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=3893. 
42 Keenan Yoho, Tess deBlanc-Knowles, and Randy Borum, “The Global SOF Network: Posturing 
Special Operations Forces to Ensure Global Security in the 21st Century,” Journal of Strategic Security 7, 
no. 2 (Summer 2014): 1–2. 
43 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, xi. 
44 Ibid., II–14. 
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allowed it to respond in ways that conventional forces cannot because of their size, 
doctrine, and political implications.”45 The USAID Field Operations Guide states that 
because SOF “are in an unconventional command, are culturally aware . . . the personnel 
in these units generally tend to be more flexible and creative and less rigid in their 
thoughts and ideas.”46  
SOF demonstrated its unique mission capability for HADR in Iraq during 
Operation Provide Comfort in 1991, along with a USAID DART and multiple NGOs 
from the humanitarian assistance community.47 The operation aimed to provide 
humanitarian assistance to half a million Kurds isolated in the mountains of northern Iraq, 
struggling with low temperatures and late winter rains after Operation Desert Storm.48 
Thomas K. Adams’ account of the operation notes that relief workers were not only 
impressed with SOF capabilities, but also their cultural sensitivities, such as “drinking tea 
with the clan leaders.”49 Furthermore, Adams contends: “the ability to provide transport 
was another, and perhaps more important, reason for NGO/military cooperation. 
Beginning with SOF UH-60 Blackhawks and Air Force [M]C-130 cargo planes . . . the 
special-operations teams could deliver relief supplies with unmatched speed and 
efficiency.”50 
USAID has an understanding of SOF and its capabilities but only on a limited 
scale. The USAID “Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response,” lists 
just two careers under their SOF section: civil affairs and psychological operations.51 The 
                                                 
45 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1997), 262. 
46 United States Agency for International Development, Field Operations Guide for Disaster 
Assessment and Response (Version 4). (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International 
Development, 2005), F–10. 
47 Gordon William Rudd, “Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: Humanitarian Intervention in Northern 
Iraq 1991” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1993). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998), 250. 
50 Ibid. Task Force Alpha included MC-130s and  C-130s. 
51 United States Agency for International Development, Field Operations Guide for Disaster 
Assessment and Response, F–10. 
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guide describes civil affairs as “units in the Army or the Civil Affairs Group in the 
Marine Corps . . . [whose] function is to provide the interface between the military and 
the civilian population, organizations, and government.”52 Referencing psychological 
operations, the field guide identifies their likely interface with the DART and 
psychological operations’ ability to “convey messages and themes intended to have an 
impact on selected target audiences.”53 There is no mention of the many other special 
operations forces and their capabilities for HADR missions.  
However, the Special Operations Joint Publication states “SOF can provide 
temporary support, such as airspace control for landing zones, communications nodes, 
security, and advance force assessments to facilitate the deployment of conventional 
forces and designated humanitarian assistance organizations until the host nation or 
another organization can provide that support.”54 Therefore, one of the first critical gaps 
between USAID and U.S. SOF is a basic understanding of SOF’s many units and their 
wide range of capabilities.  
The DOD defines AFSOF as “Active and Reserve Component Air Force forces 
designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and 
equipped to conduct and support special operations.”55 AFSOF covers a wide range of 
capabilities from, “battlefield air operations, agile combat support, aviation foreign 
internal defense, information operations/military support operations, precision strike, 
specialized air mobility; command and control; and intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance.”56 Appendix A describes these capabilities in further detail. 
AFSOF brings its own unique resources to HADR missions. Special Operations 
Doctrine states, “AFSOF supports HADR by employing Command and Control (C2), 
                                                 
52 United States Agency for International Development, Field Operations Guide for Disaster 
Assessment and Response, F–10. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, II–14. 
55 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint 
Publication 1–02 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010 amended through 2015), 7.  
56 “Mission Statement,” May 26, 2015, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/ 
Article/104528/air-force-special-operations-command.aspx.  
 17
Specialized Air Mobility, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and 
Special Tactics core mission areas.”57 This broad range of organic capabilities makes it a 
unique rapid responder. Additionally, doctrine states “AFSOF routinely operate closely 
with other governmental agencies, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental 
organizations, and other nations’ forces.”58 Special Operations Doctrine further argues 
that AFSOF “provides the capability to rapidly respond to crises of limited scale . . . these 
operations occurred during the United States’ responses after devastating earthquakes in 
Haiti and Japan.”59  
Analysis of AFSOF’s involvement in HADR tends to focus on its rapid-responder 
attributes: speed, C2, and its unique mission sets (see Appendix A). However, Major 
Philip Laughlin notes that AFSOF is “uniquely qualified to conduct initial response 
actions supporting HADR because of its distributed geographical orientation and the 
ability to deploy independently to conduct operations in austere environments with a 
small operational footprint.”60 Furthermore, since AFSOF supports short notice special 
operations missions, it is a dynamic organization designed and rebuilt according to 
mission need within the confines of regulatory guidance. 
D. CHALLENGES TO INTERAGENCY HADR 
Despite the delineation of tasks and responsibilities between U.S. civilian 
agencies and the DOD, there are considerable challenges for coordinating efforts in 
HADR missions. One challenge is definitions. USAID has created a detailed list of 
definitions of HADR events and missions aimed at providing a common framework for 
                                                 
57 Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, Annex 3-05 Special Operations 
(Montgomery, AL: Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education), 14, last updated 
January 23, 2015, https://doctrine.af.mil/DTM/dtmspecialops.htm. 
58 Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, Annex 3-05 Special Operations, 
2. 
59 Ibid., 9. 
60 Phillip A. Laughlin, “Relief from the Sky: Optimizing U.S. Air Force Special Operations Disaster 
Relief” (master’s thesis, Air Command and Staff College, 2013), 2. 
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understanding the HADR process.61 USAID defines preparedness as “activities 
undertaken in advance to ensure effective response to the impact of disasters.”62 This is 
an important concept that USAID includes in its approach to humanitarian assistance. 
The DOD, on the other hand, has capabilities that it can lend to HADR situations, but 
does not have a dedicated preparedness definition to establish disaster response plans. 
USAID further divides disasters into two categories: natural disasters and 
complex emergencies. They describe natural disasters as “earthquakes, hurricanes, 
droughts, etc., and are not initiated by or involved in human conflict.”63 By contrast, 
“complex emergencies are situations that develop because of or during a human 
conflict.”64 This distinction results in USAID responding to and addressing disasters not 
as a generic response but rather based on the specifics of a natural disaster or the 
intricacies that may be involved in dealing with a complex situation. The DOD, by 
contrast, defines a foreign disaster as, “A calamitous situation or event that occurs 
naturally or through human activities, which threatens or inflicts human suffering on a 
scale that may warrant emergency relief assistance from the U.S. Government or from 
foreign partners.”65 The key difference between USAID and DOD’s definition of 
disasters is the delineation of natural disasters versus complex emergencies; USAID 
separates the terms while the DOD merges them into a singular definition.  
USAID and the DOD have additional differences in how they define humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief. According to USAID, humanitarian assistance is, 
“generally considered emergency assistance in life-saving relief efforts.”66 Furthermore, 
USAID defines disaster relief as, “immediate, life sustaining assistance provided to 
                                                 
61 Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (USAID), U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges 
of the Twenty-First Century (PD-ABZ-322) (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International 
Development, 2004), 20. 
62 United States Agency for International Development, Field Operations Guide for Disaster 
Assessment and Response, V–6.  
63 Ibid., F–2.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 93. 
66 United States Agency for International Development, Joint Humanitarian Operations Course 
(JHOC) Workbook (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2014), 14. 
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disaster victims.”67 Combining these terms produces an overall USAID definition of 
HADR as emergency life sustaining relief efforts to disaster victims. By contrast, the 
DOD sees humanitarian assistance as activities conducted “to relieve or reduce human 
suffering, disease, hunger, or privation” and may “include activities along the relief to 
development spectrum.”68 The DOD concept of disaster relief, or foreign disaster relief, 
is immediate assistance to alleviate disaster victims suffering.69 DOD Directive 5100.46 
further describes foreign disaster relief as including, “services and commodities as well 
as the rescue and evacuation of victims; the provision and transportation of food, water, 
clothing, medicines, beds, and bedding, temporary shelter, the furnishing of medical 
equipment, medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services.”70 
The key difference between the USAID and DOD understanding of HADR is that 
the DOD provides development assistance after relief operations, while USAID focuses 
on an immediate response for relief operations; USAID’s definition does not address the 
development or recovery phases after the disaster. Rather, USAID separates the recovery 
process from HADR operations because it goes beyond immediate disaster relief.  
Overall, these differences in definitions create problems when trying to coordinate 
HADR operations across agencies. The operations conducted during HADR require 
similar coordination to that of state-building. Ghani, Lockhart, and Carnahan, writing on 
state building, highlight that a lack of consensus “makes coordination a major challenge, 
each organization . . . has its own distinctive culture, incentives and rules of operation.”71 
These differences may inhibit coordination in an environment requiring smooth 
collaboration to meet the mission of saving lives and alleviating suffering.  
                                                 
67 United States Agency for International Development, ADS Chapter 251: International Disaster 
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Another challenge between USAID and DOD is interoperability. A RAND report 
defines interoperability as “The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to 
and accept services from other systems, units, or forces, and to use the services so 
exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”72 Andrew Natsios, former 
Administrator of USAID, stated in regard to the humanitarian community versus DOD in 
HADR that “Lines of authority are confused and vague: the system works because of 
personal relationships, a notion foreign to the military, where the system works because 
of discipline, training, organization, and doctrine.”73  
Addressing the challenge to improve interoperability is difficult primarily 
because of the different cultures of the DOD and USAID. For example, another RAND 
study suggests that the DOD’s centralized organization does not integrate effectively 
with the usually decentralized organizational structures of the civilian agencies and 
non-governmental organizations.74 These cultures have limited opportunities to train 
together and then they arrive in dynamic environments requiring immediate 
understanding of each other’s abilities. HADR expert Arjun Katoch contends, “Dealing 
with such a situation in a major disaster requires professional, experienced, rapid-
deployment teams working in support of the national and local government to quickly 
establish a coordination and information management system.”75 This notion brings to 
focus that, in addition to speed and organic capabilities; interoperability is a critical 
variable to overcoming the challenges of rapid-onset foreign disaster relief. HADR 
interagency coordination is depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  HADR Interagency Coordination 
 
Source: Wm. Phillip Wilhelm, “USAID and DOD Roles in Foreign Disaster Response” 
(handout, United States Agency for International Development, 2007). 
E. CONCLUSION 
The United States has a long and storied history of providing aid to countries 
around the world that have been devastated by natural disasters. Today, this plays a 
significant part of U.S. foreign policy. Based on the strength of civilian organizations and 
the characteristics of the military that supports them, the United States has a range of 
capabilities to assist nations requesting aid. However, a lack of common definitions, 
understanding of mission sets, and poor interoperability may impose limitations on the 
ability to provide efficient and effective relief. If these factors are not addressed, the 
mission of saving lives and alleviating suffering may fail. AFSOF is a force multiplier in 
this equation that provides speed, organic C2, and unique mission sets that may 
significantly improve the government’s response to rapid-onset foreign disaster relief. 
The following chapter begins the analysis of the utility of AFSOF during these operations 
through the lens of Operation Unified Assistance, the disaster relief response to the 
December 26, 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Indonesia.  
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III. OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On December 26, 2004, a 9.3 magnitude earthquake struck within the depths of 
the Indian Ocean approximately 160 kilometers off the west coast of Northern Sumatra, 
Indonesia.76 The earthquake, the most powerful in more than 40 years, displaced massive 
volumes of water and started the deadliest tsunami in recorded history.77 See Figure 4.  
Figure 4.  Location of Earthquake 
 
Source: “India Commissions Tsunami Early Warning Center,” October 16, 2007, 
http://www.marinebuzz.com/2007/10/16/india-commissions-tsunami-early-warning-
center/.  
                                                 
76 David Deptula, Operation Unified Assistance (OUA): CSF-536 Joint Force Air Component 
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JFACC/COMAFFOR Lessons Collection Team (Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI: The Office of Air 
Force Lessons Learned, 2005), 3.  
77 United States Agency for International Development, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance: 
Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2005 (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International 
Development, 2005), 15. 
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The tsunami’s destructive waves travelled more than 3,000 miles within six hours. 
Rhoda Margesson, a specialist in international humanitarian policy, describes the waves 
as, “a trail of death and destruction as they arrived on land.”78  
An estimated 5,000,000 people region-wide experienced the effects of the 
disaster, especially in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand.79 Margesson depicts the 
resulting destruction: “In many places the physical environment is badly damaged or 
destroyed, including entire communities, homes, businesses, tourist areas, and 
infrastructure (roads, bridges, power and telephone systems, and public buildings). For 
many their means of livelihood and way of life has been wiped out. In the hardest hit 
areas, social services are severely compromised or nonexistent.”80 The Administrator of 
USAID at the time, Andrew Natsios, further added:  
I think we think of this as a tsunami. It was actually two events, an 
earthquake and then a tsunami. The earthquake is the fourth worst in 
recorded history. So, if there had been no tsunami, we still would have had 
widespread damage to the infrastructure in Aceh. In fact, 70 percent of the 
bridges in the interior of the island that were unaffected by the tsunami 
were destroyed by the earthquake.81 
Indonesia was the closest country to the epicenter of the earthquake and suffered 
the highest death toll, as well as the most damage to infrastructure; USAID estimated 
over 150,000 people dead or missing on the island of Sumatra alone.82 In less than an 
hour, the earthquake crippled the country placing more than half a million people in need 
of “emergency, lifesaving assistance.”83 In Sumatra, approximately 40 percent of 
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municipal employees died because of the disaster, which destroyed 70 percent of Banda 
Aceh’s health facilities.84  
Thailand suffered more from the tsunami’s devastating waves rather than from the 
earthquake itself. The provinces of Ranong, Phang-Nga, Phuket, Krabi, Trang, and Satun 
were the hardest hit with more than 8,000 people confirmed dead in the immediate 
aftermath and tens of thousands of people stranded or displaced.85 While most of its 
infrastructure was intact, Thailand required the delivery of emergency relief supplies and 
mortuary services to its hardest hit regions.86 As a result, the U.S. Ambassador to 
Thailand, Darryl Johnson, declared Thailand a disaster area on December 27, 2004 
paving the way for the United States to provide HADR responders.87 
Although multiple countries felt the impact of this horrific disaster, the DOD 
limited its support operations to Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka in what became 
known as Operation Unified Assistance.88 Within this DOD operation, the MEF and Air 
Force CRG supported relief efforts in Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka, while AFSOF 
supported relief efforts in Thailand and Indonesia. 
This chapter investigates the role that AFSOF played in providing HADR to 
Thailand and Indonesia following the 2004 earthquake and tsunami. The first section 
outlines the U.S. government’s response to the disaster up until AFSOF’s redeployment. 
The second section details AFSOF’s best practices and lessons learned from its HADR 
operation, while the last section summarizes the case study. Ultimately, AFSOF 
demonstrated its rapid-responder capability in Operation Unified Assistance through its 
speed, organic C2, unique mission sets (see Appendix A), and relationships. 
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B. U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
On December 27, the same day as the disaster declaration, U. S. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell pledged an initial $15 million in relief aid.89 Despite the limited 
information available, early USAID reports to the Department of State made it clear that 
DOD support was required; the Department of State quickly made the request and the 
DOD began preparing for the deployment of HADR responders.90  
The day after the earthquake hit, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
released an execution order and directed the standup of Joint Task Force (JTF)-536, in 
the vicinity of Utapao, Thailand.91 The USPACOM Mission Statement stated, 
“USPACOM provides assistance to the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand 
and other affected nations to mitigate the effects of the recent earthquake and tsunami in 
the Indian Ocean. Conduct of operations is in support of U.S. government lead agency, 
and in coordination with international organizations, non-governmental organizations and 
partner nations.”92 This order authorized the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific 
Commander to start deploying in order to activate the JTF, as well as deploy assessment 
teams to Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka.93 The U.S. Pacific Air Forces ordered the 
deployment of five Air Force C-130s to Utapao, which it later increased to eight, to 
provide airlift support.94 Additionally, Special Operations Component, United States 
Pacific Command (SOCPAC) ordered the 353rd Special Operations Group (SOG) to 
begin AFSOF preparations to support the JTF.95 
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The following day, December 28, just over 48 hours after the earthquake hit, 
USPACOM issued multiple deployment orders to DOD forces.96 Major General David 
A. Deptula reflected on Operation Unified Assistance, stating, “USPACOM was focused 
on determining the extent of damage, level of support required, and the command’s 
capacity to support Asia tsunami disaster relief efforts.”97 The SOCPAC Commander 
ordered the 353 SOG to deploy AFSOF MC-130s to Utapao; however, the 353 SOG 
would later change its destination in-flight to Bangkok.98 Just over eight hours after 
USPACOM’s initial deployment orders, the DOD assigned the III MEF Commander as 
the overall Commanding General and established JTF-536.99 Two hours later, Navy 
aircraft began arriving at Utapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield.100 Later the same day, three 
Air Force KC-135s delivered JTF-536’s forward command element to Utapao and the 
AFSOF command and control element to their new location of Don Mueang Royal Thai 
Air Force Base in Bangkok, Thailand.101  
On December 29, as the media released growing estimates of dead and missing, 
President George W. Bush increased U.S. aid assistance from $15M to $35M.102 That 
same day, the first USAID DART arrived in Bangkok, beginning an overall deployment 
of 14 DARTs with a total of 55 members and an additional 100-plus field-based support 
staff.103 In addition to the USAID DART, three DOD JTF-536 disaster relief assessment 
teams arrived in Thailand to assist in the DOD evaluation of the situation.104 
USPACOM’s initial priorities “focused on determining the extent of the damage, level of 
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support required, and the command’s capacity to support Asia tsunami disaster relief 
efforts.”105 Also on December 29, USPACOM updated their priorities to “damage 
assessment and posturing all available theater airlift assets to provide support.”106 With 
this change in mission, both the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and the Bonhomme Richard 
Expeditionary Strike Group deployed toward the area of operations to provide JTF-536 
support.107  
While conventional units were moving into position, two AFSOF MC-130s began 
flying relief missions within Thailand just three days after the disaster struck and nearly 
two days before conventional Air Force units would start flying missions.108 On the first 
day of AFSOF flights, the MC-130s moved 13 casualty evacuation victims, 1,400 body 
bags for the dead, and 48,200 pounds of relief supplies. Furthermore, AFSOF MC-130s 
were the first U.S. aircraft to arrive at Phuket International Airport and opened the Krabi 
Airport in Thailand for further relief operations.109 These new airfields not only brought 
relief into previously unreachable areas, but they also provided direct support to both 
USPACOM and Pacific Air Forces hub-and-spoke strategy to move relief supplies to 
outlying airfields and people in need.110 
On December 30, “Indonesia authorized JTF-536 overflight of Indonesian 
airspace for two weeks in support of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
operations,” including the possibility of further extensions.111 On that same day, the JTF-
536 disaster relief assessment teams arrived in Sri Lanka and Indonesia.112 Despite 
international militaries and civilian organizations already operating at both Banda Aceh 
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and Medan, Indonesia, USPACOM made landing a C-130 at Banda Aceh its top 
priority.113  
That same day, members of the 613th CRG arrived in Colombo, Sri Lanka; 
Utapao, Thailand; and Bangkok, Thailand.114 The CRG commander assigned four 
members of the 613th CRG to support AFSOF aircraft security.115 At this time, AFSOF 
already had four MC-130s flying relief missions out of Bangkok, while the Royal Thai 
Air Force’s official request for U.S. support in Bangkok continued to work through the 
reporting process.116  
On New Year’s Eve, President Bush increased the pledge of aid from $35M to 
$350M in support of ongoing disaster relief.117 At this time, six of the eight conventional 
Air Force C-130s were flying relief missions in Thailand. Simultaneously, AFSOF 
opened up two additional airfields in Trang and Ranong, Thailand.118 Just five days after 
the disaster, four of the six worst hit provinces had JTF-536 airlift operations flying relief 
missions to them.119 The JTF-536 disaster relief assessment team reported that, “the air 
bridge between Bangkok/Utapao and Phuket/Krabi was growing stronger and the JTF 
was exceeding Thai requirements for the delivery of relief supplies.”120  
Simultaneously, in Indonesia, an inter-military cooperation meeting between the 
DOD and the Indonesian military created a plan for airlift operations into the country; 
this plan included coordination between United States operations and ongoing Australian 
operations in Aceh province.121 Recognizing the versatility of airlift support, JTF-536 
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requested an Air Force ramp control team deploy to Medan, Indonesia, to support future 
airlift operations.122 SOCPAC also modified the AFSOF deployment order, omitting any 
specific deployment location in preparation for AFSOF’s move anywhere in the region to 
best facilitate support to operations in Indonesia.123 
On New Year’s Day, the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group arrived off the west coast 
of Aceh, Indonesia, three days after receiving direction to support the disaster relief 
mission. The Lincoln began flying helicopter relief sorties into Banda Aceh airfield that 
same day.124 Simultaneously, Air Force C-130s began flying missions from Utapao to 
Banda Aceh and Medan. AFSOF also began to focus on Indonesia operations as it flew 
its final missions within Thailand and began preparations to relocate to Langkawi, 
Malaysia.125 This transition ended the AFSOF mission in Thailand that included efforts 
from specialized mobility, logistics, and special tactics. The 353 SOG Commander 
described AFSOF operations in Thailand as, “a beacon for others to guide on.”126 
Ultimately, AFSOF transported 234,000 pounds of aid, 32 casualty evacuations, and 155 
relief workers and opened three airfields in Thailand.127 
On January 2, AFSOF established its headquarters in Langkawi, Malaysia (the 
U.S. Defense Attaché in Malaysia coordinated for AFSOF to base in Langkawi).128 Upon 
arrival the 353 SOG Commander assumed duties as the joint forces special operations 
component commander (JFSOCC) and provided a joint HADR mission statement to 
“Conduct integrated air operations and enable activities in support of JTF-536 HADR 
objectives in the Indonesian joint area of operations.”129 Additionally, the JFSOCC 
released a desired end state: “Assigned HADR operations handed over to designated 
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United States, international governmental organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, private voluntary organization, and/or host nation forces.”130 More 
specifically, the goal of the JFSOCC was to provide specialized SOF capabilities, to 
include identifying new airfields, forward air refueling points, bridge gaps, and turn over 
missions as soon as practical to agencies capable of meeting the need. In addition to four 
AFSOF MC-130s, the JFSOCC added an AFSOF “slick” C-130—a basic C-130 without 
specialized equipment—for increased airlift capability along with two special operations 
medical teams for an increased casualty evacuation capability.131  
On January 3, JTF-536 was re-designated as Combined Support Force (CSF)-536 
and the disaster relief assessment teams became combined support groups to reflect the 
now multinational cooperation effort.132 This date also marked the arrival of the 
Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group in Indonesia to begin its relief 
mission.133 AFSOF also began flying operations into Indonesia that same day; the first 
operations included missions into Medan and Banda Aceh.134 AFSOF MC-130s, 
specifically trained in flying in “blacked out” night operations, flew during the period of 
darkness while the conventional C-130s flew daylight operations; this effectively 
provided JTF-536 with a 24-hour airlift capability into Banda Aceh and Medan. In 
addition to airlift, AFSOF deployed a two-man special tactics team into Medan and a 
seven-man special tactics team into Banda Aceh to assist with host nation aircraft flow 
and ramp operations.135 On two different occasions, the JFSOCC infused U.S. Army 
SOF (ARSOF) teams in Banda Aceh to facilitate coordination between international 
relief entities and the Indonesian military.136 The Indonesian government prevented the 
ARSOF teams from leaving the airfield due to concerns about perceptions with the local 
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population and Aceh province security; the JFSOCC ultimately withdrew the ARSOF 
teams and redeployed them to home station.137 
The following day, January 4, the JTF-536 Air Component Coordination Element 
and JFSOCC coordinated to assess Maimun Saleh airfield, on Sabang Island ten miles 
north of Banda Aceh, and a drop zone in Meulobah the capital of Aceh.138 An AFSOF 
MC-130 completed a daylight survey and conducted a successful landing at Maimun 
Saleh airfield proving its viability.139 As assessors within Indonesia continued to identify 
ways to improve efficiency, additional Air Force strategic lift assets began flying inter-
theater airlift from basing locations outside the area of operations.140 
Beginning on January 5, the JFSOCC reported the presence of increased relief 
aircraft in the area creating significant delays due to aircraft congestion at both Banda 
Aceh and Medan. The JFSOCC recommended an effective airspace management system, 
increasing the number of forward operating bases, and improving materials handling 
equipment.141 Furthermore, he recommended opening aerial ports of debarkation in 
Malaysia and using the recently surveyed Maimun Saleh airfield.142  
The next day, USPACOM officially released the Executive Order for Operation 
Unified Assistance: “The purpose of this operation is to provide immediate life sustaining 
support to devastated areas of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand to minimize loss of life 
and mitigate human suffering.”143 Furthermore, USPACOM issued an end state: 
“Success is defined as the loss of life and human suffering of displaced persons 
minimized, the scope of the crisis no longer exceeds the capacity of the host nations, and 
all U.S. personnel are redeployed to home station or as ordered.”144 To assist in meeting 
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this end state, the U.S. Naval Ships Mercy and Essex—two medical ships—were 
deployed to support JTF-536 operations on January 8; the Essex arrived on January 18 
and the Mercy on February 3.145  
On January 9, relief supplies for operations at Banda Aceh began to exceed the 
capacity of AFSOF special tactics controllers, who were further hindered by heavy rains. 
The JFSOCC, in a situational report, recommended standing down operations until 
conditions improved: “The air traffic control, airfield, and ramp situation at Banda Aceh 
is untenable. No single authority controls the variety of international and military 
organizations operating at the field.”146 The joint force air component commander 
(JFACC) temporarily suspended all night flights into Banda Aceh pending improved 
weather and additional augmentation as a result of this recommendation. The next 
morning, a seven-member Air Force aerial port team arrived and, on January 11, AFSOF 
special tactics controllers handed-off of airfield support in Banda Aceh. On January 12, 
following improved weather, AFSOF MC-130s resumed night operations. 
Over the next few days, the JTF-536 made significant headway in their airlift 
operation. The Indonesian armed forces commander authorized JTF-536 to fly operations 
into Maimun Saleh airfield. Despite the approval, the JFACC sent another assessment 
team to Maimun Saleh airfield delaying operations into the airfield for a few days. On 
January 13, a nine-person aerial port team arrived in Medan to takeover ramp operations 
from the last special tactics team forward deployed. By January 14, conventional and 
AFSOF airlift were able to maximize relief efforts and cargo throughput into 
Indonesia.147 
On January 15, the JFACC received tactical control of all JTF-536 aircraft, except 
those organic to the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and the U.S. Ship Essex.148 The JFACC 
viewed integrating airlift under a single commander as key for unity of effort and 
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doctrinally sound, however it came 21 days into the overall 47-day relief operation.149 
That same day, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated, “We are working 
with the Indonesian Government to look at how we move from the stage of immediate 
relief to the longer-term challenge of reconstruction. And it’s important from our point of 
view since the resources that are committed to this task from the U.S. military are 
resources that have to go somewhere else.”150 In response to the U.S. transition to 
reconstruction, the World Food Program, USAID, and United Nations logistics 
representatives discontinued the movement of HADR supplies in support of JTF-536, 
except those already purchased or en route.151 AFSOF began redeploying forces to their 
home station in Japan, while the JFACC coordinated for airlift to backfill AFSOF in 
Langkawi.152  
The combined support group commanders of both Thailand and Sri Lanka 
reported, “mission accomplished” on January 17 and turned their focus to the 
redeployment of forces over the next two weeks.153 JTF-536 issued a Transition and 
Redeployment Plan on January 18, and the JFSOCC redeployed all of his forces 
including all AFSOF elements handing over control of his operations and command 
centers to the conventional Air Force representatives in Langkawi.154 The Pacific Air 
Forces Special Study “With Compassion and Hope,” quoted the deputy JFSOCC 
commander as saying, “We are first responders. We are meant to go in early, help them 
setup that infrastructure, then leave. If they need our expertise, we normally handoff to 
conventional forces. That’s what we did in Langkawi. In the air side, we walked in, set 
everything up, we got operations flowing, and then we handed off to the conventional 
forces like the 36th Airlift Squadron.”155 By this time, AFSOF had transported 563,000 
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pounds of aid, 436 relief workers and opened one airfield during their seventeen days in 
Indonesia.156 
In February, President Bush committed an additional $600M, bringing the total to 
$950 million, in support of rehabilitation and reconstruction of the areas affected by the 
disaster.157 Three days later, JTF-536 stood down its mission; JTF-536 had delivered 
more than 24.5 million pounds of relief supplies and equipment with 26 ships, 82 planes, 
and 51 helicopters and a significant presence on the ground.158 This was the largest U.S. 
air relief operation since the Berlin Airlift following World War II.159 See Figure 5 for 
the AFSOF timeline during Operation Unified Assistance. 
Figure 5.  Operation Unified Assistance AFSOF Timeline  
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C. BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED 
The AFSOF response in Operation Unified Assistance spanned from mission 
planning on December 27, 2004, the day after the disaster, until SOF’s redeployment on 
January 18, 2005. During this operation, AFSOF’s two best practices were its previously 
established relationships within the affected countries and its rapid-response capabilities. 
However, in contrast to these strong points, two additional areas were particularly 
problematic for AFSOF HADR operations: the overall understanding of AFSOF as a 
HADR rapid responder by the wider DOD and U.S. government; and ambiguous 
supporting forces concept of operations. Each of these points will be further explored 
below.  
First, AFSOF leveraged its preexisting relationships and networks in the affected 
countries to rapidly deploy and begin relief operations. Both JTF-536 and the 353 SOG 
capitalized on their own previously established relationships, which enabled an early 
DOD response for the operation.160 In Eric Shaw’s case study for the Naval War College, 
he states, “Given the benefit of experience gained through regular Cobra Gold exercises 
in the region, [the JTF Commander] chose for the JTF headquarters the Royal Thai Base 
in Utapao, Thailand.”161 AFSOF also maintains relationships with Thailand through 
regular Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises with the Thai military.162 Just prior 
to the onset of the disaster, the 353 SOG had trained in one of these exercises and its 
mission commander became the AFSOF element commander for the initial HADR 
mission in Thailand.163 These relationships allowed both the JTF-536 and AFSOF 
command elements to establish themselves on the ground in Thailand despite the overall 
lack of information on the disaster’s scope or magnitude.164 Additionally, AFSOF gained 
necessary information from its Thai contacts to divert its forces from in-flight to 
Bangkok. These relationships and the coordination they allowed were critical because 
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DOD supplies did not start arriving in Utapao until December 29, and required time to 
organize before distribution.165 
AFSOF relationships further aided relief efforts in Bangkok. In the capital, 
supplies were quickly overloading the airfield and required immediate movement to those 
in need.166 AFSOF successfully used its relationship with the Thai military to establish its 
forward headquarters exactly where the preponderance of relief supplies were located, 
and to help create a hub for the movement of aid to the hard-hit forward operating 
locations at Phuket, Krabi, Trang and Ranong airfields.167 This freedom to maneuver 
came from the 353 SOG’s initiative of communicating with common operating partners 
and reaching out to those with whom they do not often work.  
The U.S. relationship with Malaysia aided AFSOF’s rapid response in Indonesia, 
AFSOF’s second area of focus. Through the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Malaysia, 
AFSOF gained approval to setup a new forward headquarters on the island of Langkawi 
off the west coast of Malaysia. This location was significant because both Medan and 
Banda Aceh airfields remained congested and overcrowded, but this new airfield allowed 
for a closer response and the distribution of more relief supplies.168  
After the disaster, the JFACC reported that SOF “monopolized” their previously 
established relationships and networks with host nations; however, why the pejorative 
word “monopolized” was used is unclear.169 He went on to say that the “forward 
presence and the relationships/networks that are in place with host nations prior to a crisis 
are vital to an urgent operation.”170 Regardless, AFSOF successfully leaned on its 
relationships with Thai and Malaysian militaries, the Joint United States Military 
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Assistance Group, the defense attaché office, and special operations liaison element 
connections.171  
These examples of successful collaboration between U.S. and host-nation forces 
demonstrate that relationships need to be in place and accessible well before the disaster 
strikes. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, clearly summated this best 
practice, “The ability of the DOD to respond quickly would not have been possible 
without the relationships developed over many years with the militaries of countries in 
the region, particularly with Thailand.”172 Previously established connections and 
networks provided AFSOF with the means to draw in host-nation support in the case with 
Thailand and provide expertise while keeping itself in the background in the case with 
Indonesia.173 Without these relationships, AFSOF would not have been able to move into 
the Bangkok airport as quickly, nor would AFSOF likely been allowed to base off the 
Malaysian coast when assisting Indonesia.  
Second, AFSOF successfully demonstrated its rapid-response capabilities in the 
wake of this disaster, particularly its speed, organic C2, and capabilities to perform 
unique mission sets. During the disaster, the JFACC said, “A noteworthy success was the 
speed and efficiency with which United States Air Force Special Operations Forces were 
able to coordinate operations and begin airlift of supplies to the stricken region.”174 The 
JFSOCC, in his after action report, added to this that AFSOF as a “first responder” is 
“able to mitigate chaos early” and “fill in gaps until others arrive.”175 In addition to these 
traits, AFSOF’s basing in the Pacific allowed it to overcome the vast distance the disaster 
covered, as well as the global reach of its aircraft that are able to be refueled inflight.  
AFSOF demonstrated the unique capabilities of speed and C2 in its rapid response 
following the Indian Ocean earthquake and resulting tsunami. AFSOF’s advance element 
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and aircraft both arrived in Bangkok on December 28, just two days after the disaster 
occurred. It began transporting relief supplies the next day, faster than any other DOD 
aircraft. Furthermore, AFSOF demonstrated its speed and agility in its transition from 
Thailand to Indonesia. In just two days, while flying relief missions during the move, 
AFSOF was able to relocate to Langkawi, Malaysia from Bangkok and begin flying 
missions the next day in Indonesia.  
AFSOF’s organic C2 capabilities, which are able to deliver context from chaos 
while providing unity of effort, was another key element in its ability to respond rapidly. 
Furthermore, AFSOF displayed the capability of working with other military and civilian 
entities during the crisis. For example, when the disaster struck, the 353 SOG leadership 
drove to the nearby base in Okinawa where the III MEF is located and introduced 
themselves to their Marine counterparts while explaining AFSOF capabilities. As a 
result, the JTF-536 commander provided his intent to the 353 SOG, while providing the 
SOG with freedom to maneuver in supporting these objectives.  
Furthermore, the AFSOF C2 element effectively helped organize the 
multinational aid collection center at Bangkok, launched the first U.S. aircraft into 
Phuket, and opened three other airfields (Krabi, Trang, and Ranong) in Thailand.176 
These operations were in direct support to the JTF-536 and the JFACC’s hub-and-spoke 
scheme of operation, where it is critical to “ferry relief supplies to outlying airfields.”177 
Hub-and-spoke operations are depicted in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.  Hub-and-Spoke System 
 
Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Mobility Operations (Joint Publication 3–17), 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), IV–14. 
While AFSOF MC-130s cannot carry as much cargo as the Air Force’s strategic 
airlifters—the C-5, for example, can carry seven times the cargo of an MC-130—AFSOF 
can transport life-saving supplies in short time due to unique capabilities that other 
aircraft do not have, such as self-contained, instrument meteorological condition, and 
non-lit night landings.178 Additionally, AFSOF brings a multitude of other unique 
capabilities, including special tactics teams who demonstrated their capabilities the day 
after arriving in Indonesia.  
AFSOF positioned two special tactics teams at Medan and Banda Aceh airfields, 
which were responsible for controlling the flow of supplies into and out of those airfields 
until conventional support forces arrived eight days later.179 Additionally, they supported 
Indonesia’s air traffic control system and helped articulate the imperative for slot 
times.180 AFSOF special tactics teams quickly established flights and aid into and out of 
austere environments in Indonesia. 
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Due to its small size and speed, AFSOF cannot sustain itself for very long. 
Therefore, AFSOF is accustomed to handing off operations to follow-on forces or to the 
host-nation government. For example, AFSOF successfully handed off operations in 
Bangkok and Langkawi to conventional U.S. Air Force operators. Additionally, its 
special tactics teams successfully handed off ramp control at both Banda Aceh and 
Medan, Indonesia to the larger conventional U.S. Air Force mission support teams. These 
transitions of operations allowed AFSOF to focus on being a “first-in” force that is small 
and light, while supporting operations until the larger, more self-sustaining conventional 
forces arrive. The combination of size, speed, and ability to move in and out of an 
affected area makes AFSOF particularly useful in supporting the “gap within the gap.” 
A primary lesson learned during Operation Unified Assistance is that there was 
limited knowledge of AFSOF as a HADR rapid responder within the wider DOD and 
U.S. government. Prior to this operation, JTF-536 lacked an understanding of AFSOF 
HADR capabilities while AFSOF lacked clarity on the JTF-536 concept of air operations 
for HADR. This occurred despite the fact that both III MEF and the 353 SOG 
headquarters were located within driving distance from each other on the island of 
Okinawa, Japan. Furthermore, the Indonesian government did not allow DOD forces to 
support its HADR operation until January 1, 2005, while appearing to limit the ground 
contact between the Indonesian people and uniformed responders from contributing 
nations; this effectively limited the scope and impact of U.S. ARSOF HADR operations 
to Banda Aceh airfield.181 Another problem was that the JFACC measured AFSOF’s 
involvement only through pounds of good delivered versus any of its rapid-responder 
capabilities, such as its speed or ability to survey and open airfields. AFSOF ultimately 
overcame these misperceptions and lack of understanding by demonstrating its unique 
capabilities, especially with its special tactics teams in Banda Aceh and Medan.  
Another major lesson learned was about the challenges posed by an unclear 
understanding of the roles and responsibilities of supporting forces, particularly with air 
operations. This challenge became a significant problem for operations in Indonesia, 
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particularly when both Banda Aceh and Medan airfields quickly became overcrowded 
with supplies and aircraft, and bad weather further hindered operations. USAID, as the 
U.S. lead agency, did not have a direct organizational link between itself and the DOD, 
and therefore could not adequately coordinate efforts. As Shaw describes, “Even [Office 
of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance] OFDA, USAID’s entity in charge of its 
HADR efforts, was separated by three levels from the in-country military 
commanders.”182 Moreover, while USAID provided liaisons to both USPACOM and the 
JTF-536 team in Sri Lanka, there is no evidence that the DOD provided a liaison to 
USAID.  
AFSOF did not interact with USAID directly, which was another challenge for 
coordinating humanitarian efforts during the disaster. The 353 SOG provided direct 
support to JTF-536, despite the fact that the situation in Indonesia required greater 
interoperability between USAID and U.S. military forces. Specifically, AFSOF’s special 
tactics team struggled with interoperability challenges in Banda Aceh and Medan 
airfields. The uncoordinated mix of civilian and military aircraft operating at Banda 
Aceh, the limited number of special tactics personnel, and lack of immediate priorities 
created significant problems at both airfields. These operations would have benefited 
from a unified air concept of operations that could have de-conflicted roles and 
responsibilities, and better integrated efforts.  
D. CONCLUSION 
After the December 26, 2004 earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the world 
launched the largest HADR operation ever mounted: over 18 nations and 90 
nongovernmental organizations united to provide relief to those countries affected by this 
disaster.183 AFSOF was one of the initial responders for the United States. It 
demonstrated its rapid-responder capability by being one of the first forces on the ground 
and by supporting and handing-off operations in both Thailand and Malaysia for its 23-
day involvement in the massive HADR operation. In three weeks, AFSOF accomplished 
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a wide array of activities ranging from opening airfields, providing 24-hour operations 
through night-flying, organizing a multinational aid collection center in Bangkok, and 
setting up forward refueling operations for helicopters out of Maimun Saleh airfield. 
These efforts helped bring a massive amount of relief supplies to austere airfields in some 
of the hardest hit provinces in both Thailand and Indonesia. 
The largest airlift operation since the Berlin Airlift was a success; part of that 
success came from AFSOF as a rapid responder. Its relationships with partner nations and 
their militaries, along with the rapid-responder capabilities that AFSOF possesses, made 
it an important participant in Operation Unified Assistance. The next chapter is a case 
study on AFSOF’s support of Operation Damayan, the HADR operation in the 
Philippines as a result of Super Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. 
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IV. OPERATION DAMAYAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the early morning hours of November 8, 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan made 
landfall in the Visayas region along the central east coast islands of the Philippines. See 
Figure 7. In total, the hurricane lasted 16 hours with winds estimated to be 195 miles per 
hour with top gusts of 235 miles per hour, and generated a significant tidal surge.184 
Ultimately, Haiyan was the fourth most intense typhoon ever observed and the strongest 
typhoon to ever make landfall.185  
Figure 7.  Path of Super Typhoon Haiyan 
 
Source: “Humans to Blame for Scaled of Devastation Caused by Typhoon Haiyan,” 
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The path of destruction hit a large section of the Philippine islands. Kenneth 
Stewart and Dale Kuska, two communications experts, describe the immediate aftermath 
in Guiuan, a small municipality on a remote island in Samar Province, “Minutes later, 
nearly every single one of its 50,000 men, women and children had nothing.”186 They go 
on to state, “By the end of the day, Haiyan had met a broad swath of the central 
Philippines, and it had left incomprehensible devastation across the Southeast Asia nation  
. . .  thousands had died, millions were homeless, and billions in damage had left the 
country in ruin.”187 The nation’s infrastructure suffered significant damage leaving areas 
with no running water or electricity and terrible destruction along the storm’s path.188  
The disaster, which would prove to be the deadliest natural disaster in Philippine 
history, affected over 10 percent of the nation’s 105 million people.189 A 2014 
Congressional report identified that the storm damaged or destroyed 65 to 90 percent of 
all structures in its trajectory; roads became blocked with fallen trees or debris; and 
airfields, a vital link within the island nation, sustained significant damage.190 The 
Congressional report further estimated the number of dead at 6,201 with nearly 5.6 
million people requiring food assistance and 1.1 million homes damaged or destroyed.191 
These staggering numbers were the compounded result of both Typhoon Haiyan and a 
7.1 magnitude earthquake that hit the region on October 15, less than a month before the 
typhoon.  
In response to the crisis the DOD launched Operation Damayan on November 10, 
which means “helping each other” in Tagalog, the language of the region.192 The DOD 
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supported this mission primarily with MEF in conjunction with the Pacific Fleet of the 
Navy, an Air Force CRG, and SOF, including AFSOF. 
This chapter investigates the role of AFSOF during Operation Damayan following 
the 2013 super typhoon in the central Philippines. The next section details HADR 
knowledge gained from previous operations, followed by a section on the U.S. 
government response to Super Typhoon Haiyan. The following section identifies the best 
practices and lessons learned. Similar to Operation Unified Assistance, the response to 
the 2004 earthquake and subsequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean, AFSOF was able to 
leverage its rapid-responder capabilities and interoperability through its already 
established relationships in the region. Moreover, knowledge from prior HADR 
operations, specifically the January 2010 HADR mission to Haiti following a devastating 
earthquake (Operation Unified Response), provided an opportunity to bridge capability 
gaps and hasten the pace of relief delivery in the Philippine disaster. However, a critical 
lesson learned—the need to ensure that the larger HADR command structure understands 
AFSOF and how to use its assets effectively—becomes particularly evident in the 
unfolding of this operation. The final section provides a summary and conclusion of the 
chapter. 
B. HADR KNOWLEDGE FROM PREVIOUS OPERATIONS 
Prior to the disaster of Haiyan, AFSOF had engaged in several HADR efforts that 
helped hone its response to the super typhoon in the Philippines. First, as described in 
Chapter III, AFSOF learned valuable lessons from its contributions to the disaster relief 
in the wake of the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Thailand and Indonesia. These lessons 
included making use of established relationships, the ability to establish austere airfield 
operations to open an aerial port, and handing off operations when no longer providing a 
unique capability. 
Another of the more notable HADR operations that AFSOF participated in was 
Operation Unified Response, the multinational relief effort following the 2010 
earthquake in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Specifically, AFSOF was instrumental to opening a 
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port for aid to arrive approximately 28 hours after the earthquake struck.193 Using its 
unique command structure, AFSOF was able to provide air traffic control services; 
airfield security; search and rescue; critical care evacuation; austere surgical operations 
teams; aerial port duties; humanitarian aerial delivery zone assessments; command and 
control capabilities; and linguistics professionals.194 The most significant of these 
capabilities was the ability to open the airfield to international aid in Port-au-Prince. 
Highlighting capabilities, the Commander of the Joint Special Operations Air 
Component—Haiti (JSOAC-H), Colonel “Buck” Elton, described, “We landed at 7pm 
EST and had the Port-au-Prince airfield under our tactical air traffic control 28 minutes 
later.”195 This tactical control began the AFSOF mission of preparing the airfield for a 
massive relief effort.  
As part of this effort to open the airfield, AFSOF special tactics personnel 
provided the capability to get the airfield operational during the chaos created by the 
disaster. AFSOF personnel managed to establish command and control at the airport to 
accommodate “over 250 aircraft per day without phones, computers, or electricity.”196 
Under these conditions, AFSOF managed to bring in a total of 1,667 aircraft, 800 rotary 
wing missions, over four million pounds of aid, and the aerial delivery of 80,000 pounds 
of supplies to isolated areas.197 AFSOF organized and controlled aircraft movement at 
Port-au-Prince’s Toussaint L’Ouverture International Airport for a total of 12 days, from 
the evening of January 13 until January 25, when AFSOF handed over the field to U.S. 
Air Guard air traffic control personnel.198 
Lieutenant Colonel Travis Norton, an Air Force Fellow with the Institute of 
Defense Analysis, states in a review of the HADR mission to Haiti that: 
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By their very nature SOF are employed as the crisis response force. They 
are not organized, trained or equipped for long-term, large-scale steady 
state operations. After the initial weeks of the international relief effort, 
command guidelines and the greater support infrastructure “began to gel.” 
As additional capability was brought in . . . [AFSOF] started pulling back 
from “enabling the gaps” and focused on the primary job of taking care of 
airfield operations. In fact after the first week the 1st [Special Operations 
Group] SOG planners began preparing for their redeployment.199 
These same traits would be leveraged in the Philippines in 2013.  
C. U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO SUPER TYPHOON HAIYAN 
The U.S. HADR response to Super Typhoon Haiyan benefited from the advanced 
warning systems designed to monitor typhoon activity in the Pacific. Given this warning, 
USAID had prepositioned a DART in Manila prior to the storm making landfall and 
began assessing the damage immediately following the storm’s passing.200  
The day after the typhoon hit the Philippines, U.S. chargé d’affaires Brian L. 
Goldbeck declared a disaster, setting in motion the mechanisms needed for a HADR 
response by the U.S. government.201 The same day, USAID’s OFDA began to provide 
funding for an immediate response, initially allocating $20 million.202 The U.S. DOS 
formally requested assistance from the DOD after the host nation sought support; 
subsequently, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel immediately directed the DOD to 
deploy appropriate HADR assets to assist in providing relief efforts.203 
Further expediting the response, multiple DOD elements had begun preparations 
for a HADR mission before the storm ever made landfall based on reports of the typhoon 
bearing down on the Philippines. Within AFSOF, the 353rd SOG began tracking the 
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storm as a tropical depression on November 4; simultaneously, the SOG deployed an 
advanced team to Clark Air Base in the northern portion of the Philippines as part of a 
scheduled training exercise later that month. Beginning on November 6—days before the 
typhoon hit—USPACOM contacted the 36 CRG to begin preparations for a possible 
deployment due to the typhoon.204 Furthermore, USPACOM directed Marine Forces 
Pacific to begin planning response options to assist with a possible HADR mission to the 
Philippines.205  
The III MEF crisis action team was already established and issued orders to 
prepare the deployment of its 3rd MEB when the formal orders came through on 
November 9.206 The Air Force CRG sent a liaison to Okinawa to imbed with III MEF to 
assist U.S. Marine Forces Pacific on understanding conventional Air Force 
capabilities.207 Anticipating further instruction, the Pacific Air Forces ordered the lead 
elements of the joint air component coordination element (JACCE) and CRG to deploy to 
Camp Aguinaldo in Manila where the Armed Forces of the Philippines headquarters 
resides.208  
The impact of AFSOF units, in particular, was immediate. The aviation 
detachment of the Joint Special Operations Task Force—Philippines (JSOTF-P), a 
preexisting special operations counterterrorism task force composed of U.S. SOF units 
working in conjunction with their host-nation counterparts to stabilize the Southern 
Philippines, began conducting operations the morning after the typhoon made landfall.209 
JSOTF-P, headquartered out of Camp Navarro in Zamboanga, directed their assets to 
conduct aerial reconnaissance on the areas damaged by the typhoon, collecting valuable 
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information on the status of airfields and lines of communications, especially on the hard 
hit islands of Leyte and Samar.210  
Shortly after reviewing the initial images, SOCPAC approved JSOTF-P to assist 
with HADR operations on November 10.211 By early evening, JSOTF-P had successfully 
inserted a joint SOF team into Tacloban airfield; this airfield would prove to be the 
lifeline of the HADR operation.212 The team consisted of a Special Forces officer, a 
medic, and a communications sergeant; two Civil Affairs soldiers; and an AFSOF special 
tactics controller.213  
Two days after the storm hit, the lead elements of the JACCE and CRG personnel 
arrived at Villamor Air Base in Manila to embed with the 3D MEB in their Combined 
Operations Center, which the Marines had stood up that day.214 This began the 
integration of U.S. DOD services, including SOF who stood up a special operations 
liaison element (SOLE) within the Combined Operations Center.215 Through the SOLE, 
AFSOF had a connection to III MEF, the host nation, NGOs, and others providing relief 
to the Philippines. On November 10, the 3D MEB deployed with aviation units from 
Okinawa, including 12 MV-22 Osprey and eight KC-130Js.216 These Marine Corps 
aviation units arrived that day at Clark Air Base and Villamor Air Base, which became 
the hub of the operation while the multinational forces concentrated at Mactan-Cebu 
International Airport.217 See Figure 8.  
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Figure 8.  Operation Damayan Hub-and-Spoke System 
 
Source: Art Behnke, “Operation Damayan” (presentation, U.S. Marine Corps Forces 
Pacific, Okinawa, Japan, December 9, 2013). 
As the main hub of operations, aid flowed from Villamor to Tacloban, which was 
the best airfield for reaching the epicenter of destruction.  
While other U.S. and Philippine forces were still deploying, an AFSOF special 
tactics team provided the first U.S. military “eyes on” Tacloban airfield.218 The team 
assessed that Tacloban, in its current state, could only handle daylight operations in clear 
weather. Furthermore, the current ground controller equipment did not allow for 
communication with the Filipino C-130s. Finally, there was no road access to the airfield 
or city.219  
Simultaneously, the 353 SOG established an incident response team to assess 
options for providing assistance; building off the exercise plan in place the SOG 
determined they could provide special tactics teams enabling 24-hour airfield operations 
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at Tacloban with specialized mobility aircraft and the ability to expand to other nearby 
fields.220 These assets deployed with equipment to communicate with all aircraft 
operating into the airfield and enabled an around-the-clock flow of supplies to the field, 
thus overcoming the isolation from land routes. Supporting these elements, AFSOF 
deployed an organic logistics supply line, maintenance, communications, medical, and 
security forces.221 
As the operation moved into its third day, the Philippine government placed seven 
provinces under a state of national calamity, further stressing the need for DOD 
assistance.222 In response, USPACOM issued an Execution Order on November 11 
identifying USAID as the lead federal agency and making Marine Forces Pacific the lead 
command for the military response.223 The order directed U.S. military forces “to enable 
relief operations in the Republic of the Philippines in order to mitigate further loss of life, 
additional suffering, and reduce the scope of the disaster.”224 USPACOM listed its 
requirements as providing USAID with damage assessments and intra-theater lift support; 
military-to-military support to the Philippine military in affected areas; and support to 
transition other organizations in the recovery phase.225 Within this effort, SOCPAC 
released its AFSOF concept of operations described as: delivering supplies; civilian 
evacuation; expanding the range of airlift assets; supporting HADR assessments with 
ground SOF teams; handing-off operations to conventional forces; and relocating assets 
for further HADR support.226 On this same day, AFSOF U-28s began manned 
surveillance of the disaster areas, providing dynamic real-time HADR assessments from 
the air of critical population centers and lines of communication.227 
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On November 12, AFSOF’s specialized mobility MC-130s arrived in the 
Philippines, bringing with them an all-weather day or night, fixed-wing mobility 
platform.228 These aircraft delivered robust special tactics teams comprised of weather, 
medical, and airfield control specialists along with communications equipment and all-
terrain vehicles to control ground movements; they arrived in Tacloban late in the 
afternoon, which enabled night operations and better communications with all relief 
aircraft.229 In less than 24 hours, AFSOF special tactics nearly doubled the operating 
window for available air support.230 The special tactics members controlled Tacloban for 
two additional days before transferring overall responsibility to Marine Air Traffic 
Control Mobile Teams and providing background support while moving on to outlying 
airfields to conduct assessments.231 During their time at Tacloban, special tactics 
controlled all rotary wing traffic, night fixed wing traffic, airfield management 
operations, and numerous medical functions.232  
On November 13, USPACOM designated the Commanding General of III MEF, 
Lieutenant General John Wissler, as the Commander of Joint Task Force (JTF)-505. 
General Wissler, however, did not arrive in the Philippines until the next day, six days 
after the disaster struck.233 On November 14, the U.S. Navy George Washington Strike 
Group arrived off the coast of the Philippines and began conducting HADR operations 
using its H-60 and E-2 aircraft.234 Special tactics collaborated with the helicopter assets 
of the Washington, ultimately conducting 23 sling load deliveries—bundles secured to 
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the bottom of a helicopter delivered to remote clearings—over the rest of the 
operation.235  
That same day, a CRG airfield assessment team from Andersen Air Force Base in 
Guam arrived at Tacloban; they completed their first task of assessing the field for C-17 
operations within a few hours concluding the field could only handle a single C-17 at a 
time.236 Despite no strategic airlift to date, the 3D MEB Combined Operations Center 
was conducting 24-hour operations employing AFSOF MC-130s, Marine KC-130Js and 
MV-22s.237 Furthermore, on November 14, an AFSOF MC-130 delivered special tactics 
personnel to Ormoc airfield and MV-22s delivered another special tactics team to 
Guiuan to establish operational airfields.238 Guiuan and Ormoc would become 
important supply hubs for the relief effort.  
On November 15, the first C-17 arrived at Tacloban with mission handling 
equipment, mission controllers, security forces, and aerial port-centric personnel required 
by the CRG. That same day, a second C-17 of CRG personnel landed at Clark Air Base 
to establish a robust aerial port there.239 Two more U.S. Navy Ships, the Germantown 
and Ashland, prepared for a November 17 departure from Okinawa with additional 
elements of the MEU on-board to support HADR operations; they arrived on November 
20.240 
On November 16, JTF-505 officially stood up and the JACCE began to 
coordinate airlift for 3D MEB.241 That same day, three conventional Air Force C-130s 
and 80 Air Force personnel arrived at Clark Air Base after having just completed a 
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HADR exercise in Bangladesh.242 As forces were coming together, the JACCE 
Commander, Brigadier General James Hecker, described his authority as “the ability to 
coordinate scalable joint and multinational air assets allowed us to augment the 3D 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s established process supporting the Philippine 
government’s airlift mission.”243 Primary missions included the delivery of aid and 
transportation of internally displaced persons. Additional high priority missions included 
tasks such as delivering mission critical refueling equipment to replace malfunctioning 
equipment at the supply node in Guiuan.244 
The JTF-505 (Forward) reached its initial operating capacity on November 18.245 
The role of the JTF, as described by the U.S. Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 
was “to coordinate the U.S. military’s HADR efforts, in conjunction with the Department 
of State and USAID, to support the government of the Philippines-led response to 
Typhoon Haiyan.”246 As the JTF stood up in country, AFSOF special tactics teams were 
handing-off operations at Guiuan to a Marine Air Traffic Control Mobile Team, while 
simultaneously opening operations at Borongan.247 
As the response moved into its tenth day on November 19, an AFSOF MC-130 
filled a critical capability gap by flying a mission for the 3D MEB that involved moving 
sanitation equipment out of Zamboanga to the disaster zone in Tacloban. No other 
aircraft in the area of operations could fly in the weather conditions present to fulfill this 
priority mission. An AFSOF MC-130 used advanced terrain following radar and an 
internally calculated self-contained approach to deliver the equipment, a mission that 
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AFSOF was uniquely qualified to perform.248 AFSOF MC-130s used this unique 
capability three additional times during critical moments of the operation.249  
On November 20, JTF-505 reached its full operational capacity, four days prior to 
USAID terminating requests to use military airlift for delivery of relief supplies.250 In the 
limited time remaining, the JACCE established air movement slot times, which provided 
known arrival times of aircraft at airfields to ensure available ramp space to improve the 
movement of the remaining supplies. This system replaced the previously established role 
of the 3D MEB acting “as the focal point for U.S. airlift [operations, including those 
conducted by AFSOF,] supporting Operation Damayan.”251 That same day, Pacific Fleet 
began to redeploy their forces as the George Washington departed the area of 
operations.252 The total in humanitarian funding by the DOD and USAID had reached 
over $47 million by this date.253 
The following day, the CRG initiated potential redeployment options from 
Tacloban and drew up plans for turning over all airfield responsibility to Filipino civil 
authorities.254 In Ormoc, the special tactics team handed over control of operations to 
host-nation air traffic control and shut down its operations at Borongan because the 
airfield was no longer required.255 The following day, November 22, JSOTF-P personnel 
returned to their pre-typhoon mission within the Philippines and AFSOF personnel from 
the 353 SOG completed the remainder of their exercise in Luzon or returned to their 
home base in Okinawa.256 
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As AFSOF assets were relieved from the HADR mission, elements of the DOD 
continued to support overall relief efforts. On November 23, an Air Force C-130 
delivered the final shipment of USAID-requested supplies to Tacloban Airport during a 
final surge of conventional relief sorties.257 
On November 24, the DOD announced it would begin to draw down forces and 
the Philippine government and other humanitarian organizations would assume all 
HADR roles. JTF-505 completed its mission on December 1.258 The drawdown 
continued until December 3, just over three weeks after the initial disaster; the DOD 
disestablished JTF-505 and the military operation ended.259 During the period of DOD 
involvement in the relief operation, U.S. funding for the effort reached just under $60 
million.260 
According to Lum and Margesson’s description of the U.S. and international 
response to the disaster, “at its peak, U.S. military efforts included more than 13,400 
military personnel, 66 aircraft, and 12 naval vessels. The U.S. military delivered more 
than 2,495 tons of relief supplies and evacuated over 21,000 people, including 500 
American citizens. Also, over 1,300 flights were completed in support of the relief efforts 
for Operation Damayan delivering to approximately 450 sites.”261 During this process, 
AFSOF MC-130 aircrews contributed to the movement of over 3,000 individually 
displaced persons and 678,000 pounds of aid across 155 sorties and 188 hours of flight 
time; additionally, U-28s enabled the early and accurate assessments of where to deliver 
forces and aid.262 These contributions were made possible by the efforts of special tactics 
personnel who enabled night operations at Tacloban, opened three additional airfields, 
controlled over 650 flights delivering in excess of 1.8 million pounds of relief and 
moving 6,590 individually displaced persons. Furthermore, their efforts enabled the 
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transfer of 126,000 pounds of fuel to rotary wing assets and 23 helicopter sling load 
operations.263 See Figure 9 for an AFSOF timeline. 
Figure 9.  Operation Damayan AFSOF Timeline 
D. BEST PRACTICES AND LESSON LEARNED 
The AFSOF mission during Operation Damayan lasted a total of 13 days, from 
November 9, when JSOTF-P first directed special tactics members to make airfield 
assessments, until the redeployment of all SOF to pre-typhoon roles on November 22. 
During this operation, AFSOF’s two best practices included its rapid-response 
capabilities and interoperability fostered through relationships. These positive attributes 
enabled AFSOF to respond effectively to the operation. In addition to these best 
practices, AFSOF also learned valuable lessons, specifically, that they could have 
improved communication with the command elements during Operation Damayan, which 
would have provided a more coordinated relief effort. These points will be further 
discussed below. 
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AFSOF’s rapid-response capabilities proved critical during Operation Damayan, 
specifically its speed resulting from its alert posture, its organic C2, and its unique mission 
sets (see Appendix A). In the case of Operation Damayan, AFSOF special tactics from the 
353 SOG began mission preparation before the typhoon even struck the Philippines; they 
immediately put an airfield zone reconnaissance team into alert and used imagery to 
identify C-130 capable runways in the projected path of the storm.264 By the time the DOD 
had officially tasked the 353 SOG on November 11, it was already prepared with three 
different courses of action ranging from small to large deployment packages.265  
AFSOF’s flexible readiness allowed its four MC-130s and multiple special tactics 
teams to arrive in theater less than 24 hours after initial notification and began making an 
immediate impact. Once on the ground there was no need to devise approaches to meet 
the need of opening fields for night operations; special tactics teams were ready to 
operate immediately. This was possible because AFSOF understood the mission, tailored 
their deployment accordingly, and ensured the right mixture of capabilities based on 
regular alert deployments. 
Second, AFSOF provided organic C2 capabilities that otherwise would not have 
been present in the immediate aftermath of the typhoon. A MEB officer described the 
complex logistical plan, “All of the [USAID] materials flew into Villamor Air Base from 
Manila, from Dubai, from USAID stores, that’s where we [established] the first hub. 
Then we ‘spoked’ it out to Tacloban, so [for] distribution, the air assets were the only 
way to move those.”266 While the hub-and-spoke system provided a logistical design to 
move aid efficiently throughout the country, it required AFSOF’s C2 capability to run 
operations out of multiple airfields simultaneously in a short timeline. AFSOF sent a 
liaison to Villamor Air Base to coordinate operations with the MEB and USAID. 
Additionally, AFSOF used its light, yet capable, joint special operations air detachment 
to run primary AFSOF operations out of Clark Air Base. AFSOF then used self-contained 
264 320th Special Tactics Squadron, Operation Damayan After Action Brief (Okinawa, Japan: 320 
STS, 2013). 
265 Jackson, “U.S. SOF’s Role in Operations Damayan.”  
266 United States Marine Corps, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, 11. 
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special tactics teams to run forward operations out of Tacloban, Guiuan, Ormoc, and 
Borongan. Through this web, AFSOF informed the Combined Operations Center which 
fields were open and their status on receiving aid. This information allowed the 
coordination cell at Villamor to work with USAID on the most expeditious way to get aid 
forward.  
Third, AFSOF’s unique mission sets were particularly valuable for this operation. 
AFSOF’s special tactics personnel and its aviation capabilities played a lead role due to 
their night-vision-goggle capabilities, all-weather capable platforms, and rapid air-land 
infiltration and exfiltration.267 These capabilities allowed for 24-hour operations into 
Tacloban airfield, the primary forward airfield for this operation. A JSOTF-P report 
commented on AFSOF’s special tactics involvement in this operation, “The opening of 
airfields by (Special Tactics Controllers) was absolutely critical to the success of the 
entire relief effort and it was one of the most visible actions that showed the host nation 
and the world that help was coming to the Philippines.”268 The action of these special 
tactics members alleviated choke points in the flow of aid enabling Marine and 
international airlift by day and AFSOF MC-130s (and later in the operation conventional 
C-130s) during the night to remote and outlying fields.269 AFSOF’s ability to not only 
open austere airfields, but to operate out of them in almost any condition, allowed the 
people of the Philippines to receive support early into the relief operation. 
Overall, AFSOF was able to respond to the call for assistance from the 
Philippines and other services based on its rapid-response capabilities. As the JSOTF-P 
Commander contends, “The 353 SOG was critical to the emplacement and support of 
JSOTF-P personnel, the movement of hundreds of internally displaced persons, and the 
delivery of thousands of pounds of relief supplies.”270 AFSOF’s alert posture, organic C2 
capabilities, and unique mission sets assisted JSOTF-P, the MEB, the CRG, and 
Philippine forces to succeed in this operation.  
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In addition to rapid-response attributes, the ability to leverage pre-existing 
relationships and create new ones throughout the operation enabled a greater response by 
AFSOF. These relationships spanned both established connections in the host nation 
along with newly formed partnerships with fellow DOD units and other humanitarian 
counterparts. Lum and Margesson highlight that, “U.S. military forces are involved in 
several regular joint exercises and ongoing military missions in the Philippines. The two 
major ones are the Balikatan (Shoulder-to-Shoulder) exercises and the JSOTF-P 
counterterrorism assistance.”271 They further state that when the typhoon made landfall, 
the United States had a “small footprint” inside the Philippines; the primary presence was 
roughly 500 individuals supporting JSOTF-P on counterterrorism training.272 The 
JACCE describes the resulting relationship between the two countries, “the Philippine 
military has a positive view of the United States based on historical bonds, a standing 
mutual defense treaty, and ongoing combined SOF operations.”273 These relationships 
opened doors and forged a trusting partnership with the Philippine government that 
helped efficiently provide aid to the country.  
These relationships led to SOF’s ability to move and interact with the public. A 
Special Warfare article on Operation Damayan highlights that JSOTF-P personnel, who 
include AFSOF members, “were conducting ground and aerial movements around the 
clock to assess remote areas and interact with the local populations and relief 
agencies.”274 The initial freedom of movement of JSOTF-P and AFSOF assets enabled 
proper asset allocation through, “insight into the conditions of the affected areas and 
facilitated with accurate planning.”275 The JSOTF-P Commander highlighted the 
importance of assisting in the operation while not taking over through the following 
statement, “Experienced SOF operators knew where to go to find the centers of gravity in 
the Human Domain and force multiply by orchestrating existing networks. While SOF 
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teams bring high impact, they are innately designed to be the small-footprint, low-
signature asset that enables others (host nation and relief elements) to remain the 
epicenter of attention.”276 AFSOF’s regular exercises, combined with JSOTF-P’s 
supportive mission, allowed SOF as a whole to support Operation Damayan in a critical 
way. Furthermore, AFSOF members created new networks, especially between special 
tactics and the Marine MV-22 crews, to branch out and get aid to people in need. 
In addition to the success listed above, AFSOF learned an important lesson during 
Operation Damayan. While AFSOF’s relationship with USAID was good during this 
operation, USAID fixated on Tacloban as the central point for aid distribution in the 
disaster area. As support to USAID, the 3D MEB’s priority and main effort was to 
support the airfield at Tacloban while AFSOF provided other options to expand the relief 
web out further.277 For the first 48 hours of the operation, the 3D MEB did not 
understand what AFSOF could provide beyond airlift because they saw the Air Force 
solely as airplane centric and did not understand the ground element of AFSOF special 
tactics teams.278 Eventually, through the Combined Operations Center and interaction 
with the SOLE, the 3D MEB became comfortable with AFSOF acting as forward ground 
teams running airfields, hastening the creation of the hub-and-spoke tactic and opening 
new airfields. However, by not having a joint planning session early in the operation to 
explain capabilities, the JTF did not move aid as efficiently as was possible. To counter 
this, AFSOF brought with them its largest package available for special tactics, enabling 
them to operate and run multiple airfields.  
Within the guidance from JTF-505, special tactics teams built relationships with the 
Marine MV-22 aircrews and were able to secure flights to Guiuan and Borongan. Through 
these relationships, AFSOF moved to these locations and opened the airfields for HADR 
operations. While these operations succeeded in providing relief to communities stranded 
deeper in the country, USAID was not the organization dictating these efforts. Rather, 
USAID was aware of AFSOF actions through coordination at the Combined Operations 
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Center.279 From this experience, USAID witnessed AFSOF moving forward from 
Tacloban without official tasking and provided approval through consent.280 This 
illustrates how rapid responders may get ahead of guidance, which could have negative 
consequences, including distrust between entities on the ground. Furthermore, lack of 
coordination between rapid responders and the lead agency can have dangerous 
consequences by putting vital aid where it does not belong or cannot be distributed. Finally, 
this lack of coordination can simply waste invaluable time and resources from priority 
missions. Andrew Natsios, in his book U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse, discusses this sensitive topic, “Any military mission with objectives that are 
ill-defined, conflicting, or simply unrealistic is likely to fail, however noble its purpose.”281  
In this case, AFSOF stretched beyond the desires of USAID, though with their 
consent, and could have caused mistrust or in the worst scenario, derailed the HADR 
operation had anything gone wrong. USAID remained “in the loop” and AFSOF never 
performed anything undesired; however, AFSOF teetered on the edge of this fine line and 
without formal coordination could have if they were not careful. To overcome this situation 
a better joint planning process early in the operation would have been beneficial. This joint 
planning process would provide AFSOF with a forum to explain their capabilities prior to 
operating in chaos in the wake of a disaster. Instead, stakeholders did their planning in a 
vacuum with the MEF preparing their forces, JSOTF-P operating in country, the 353 SOG 
focusing on transitioning to the Philippines, and USAID concentrating only on Tacloban as 
an aerial port before integrating with the other forces.282 Brigadier General Hecker, in his 
observations on Operation Damayan states, “Natural disasters in the Pacific are a matter of 
‘when,’ not ‘if.’ And rather than waiting until a disaster strikes to assemble a joint, 
interagency HADR team, an off-the-shelf JTF construct should be designed and 
exercised.”283 To overcome these issues highlighted by the JACCE commander, AFSOF 
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needs to coordinate with the other players early in the event to explain what their unique 
capabilities are so other forces use these resources properly. Furthermore, AFSOF needs to 
communicate what they are doing to ensure it meets the needs of the supported forces and 
not conduct operations just because they can. Fortunately, AFSOF’s ability to move 
forward in this operation worked out well, but this may not always be the case. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Operation Damayan stood up to its Tagalog translation of “helping each other.” 
The U.S. response was extremely quick and efficient. AFSOF played a major part in this 
operation, as part of the standing JSOTF-P and through the 353 SOG. Both SOF 
organizations used AFSOF to react to this disaster in unmatched speed providing support 
for operations into Tacloban and three additional airfields: Guiuan; Ormoc; and 
Borongan. AFSOF provided 24-hour capacity at Tacloban airfield, a critical piece of the 
hub-and-spoke construct. AFSOF used its rapid-responder capabilities, unique 
relationships, and past lessons learned to become a critical force multiplier for host nation 
and conventional forces. These capabilities, however, also allowed AFSOF to get ahead 
of USAID’s intended initial guidance due to a lack of understanding. 
The next chapter will include recommendations and conclusions on the utility of 
AFSOF in HADR operations through reflection on the literature reviewed, and the case 
studies. From this discussion, the thesis will provide a concept of operations for how 
AFSOF should respond to disasters when they occur in the future. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. SUMMARY POINTS  
History has shown us that natural disasters are a given in life; however, even with 
this understanding it is difficult to prepare for them, and, once a disaster occurs, it 
requires rapid responders to overcome their devastating effects. Within the DOD, AFSOF 
is a valuable entity for disaster rapid response based on their capabilities and 
relationships. AFSOF has the ability to fill critical gaps in providing relief, particularly in 
the first hours and days following the disaster, and can create the conditions for larger 
forces to deploy to austere and devastated regions. However, even though AFSOF has 
conducted successful HADR missions in the past, there are still opportunities to improve 
on these missions. Specifically, AFSOF needs to improve its interaction with USAID and 
other DOD rapid responders to apply its unique skills more effectively when called upon 
to mitigate loss of life and alleviate suffering during the next major disaster.  
To illustrate these points, this thesis began with a short history of U.S. 
involvement in HADR operations. It included a brief discussion on the process of U.S. 
involvement in foreign disasters, as well as the key players are in the U.S. government, 
particularly USAID and the DOD. Within the DOD, it noted the crucial HADR capable 
forces include MEF, Air Force CRG, SOF, and AFSOF, in particular.  
The thesis then investigated two recent HADR missions. Chapter III provided a 
review of Operation Unified Assistance, the largest international relief efforts in history. 
AFSOF participation in this operation included four critical contributions. First, it made 
use of its preexisting relationships in the Pacific theater, particularly its relationship with 
the Thai military to access airbases and reach the most affected areas in the region. 
Second, it leveraged its organic C2 and speed capabilities, specifically using its own C2 
channels to divert its staging location from Utapao to Bangkok, based on information 
received from Thai contacts. Once on the ground, AFSOF’s speed of operations meant 
moving supplies ahead of other DOD assets. Additionally, these attributes allowed 
AFSOF to provide immediate relief to Thailand and then swiftly move operations in 
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support of Indonesia. As a third contribution, AFSOF further used its contacts to establish 
a relationship with the Malaysian military to open a new staging location on the west 
coast of Malaysia allowing for relief efforts to Indonesia. Fourth, once operations started 
into Indonesia, the AFSOF special tactics teams controlled the dangerously congested 
ramps at Medan and Banda Aceh airfields, while opening the Maimun Saleh airfield, 
which allowed for a hub-and-spoke tactic for delivering aid from distribution centers to 
hard-hit areas.  
Chapter IV traced AFSOF’s involvement in Operation Damayan, which provided 
relief following the 2013 Super Typhoon Haiyan that swept across the central 
Philippines. Building off the lessons learned from Operation Unified Response after the 
2010 Haitian earthquake, AFSOF provided three critical capabilities to relief efforts in 
the Philippines. First, AFSOF made use of lessons learned from Haiti by developing a 
HADR course of action ahead of any formal tasking and by establishing the Tacloban 
airfield for 24-hour operations. Second, AFSOF offered an almost immediate response to 
Operation Damayan by leveraging forces already situated in the Philippines. Third, 
AFSOF utilized their organic C2, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
capabilities, and its relationships to comprehend the severity of the situation quickly and 
go to where the aid was needed most. Examples of these capabilities included airborne 
surveillance that helped establish aid stations and identify areas in need. Additionally, 
special tactics coordinated with the local populace and Marine MV-22 crews to help 
identify and open three additional airfields beyond Tacloban.  
In addition to these contributions, both Operation Unified Assistance and 
Operation Damayan offered areas of improvement for AFSOF in future HADR 
operations. In Operation Unified Assistance, other HADR agencies lacked a full 
understanding of AFSOF’s capabilities, leading to a less than optimal employment of 
AFSOF during the operation. For example, the JTF was unaware of the capabilities 
AFSOF could provide in different phases of the operation and various agencies were 
uncomfortable working with units labeled “special operations.” The same issue of 
misunderstanding on the capabilities of AFSOF was also present during the 2013 
operation in the Philippines. For example, the lack of a joint planning session or 
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integration before arriving on the ground in country resulted in the MEF initially not 
understanding AFSOF’s special tactics capabilities.  
Finally, the case studies revealed that each of the DOD rapid responders 
complemented the others in specific ways and each has its own strengths and limitations. 
Specifically, the MEF has organic sea, land, and air assets, in addition to a long-term 
sustainment capability. Because of these characteristics, the MEF tends to be the lead 
DOD entity for responding to rapid-onset foreign natural disasters. This was the case 
during both Operation Unified Assistance and Operation Damayan. The MEF, however, 
does not have a fleet of strategic airlift assets, or a robust ability to open isolated airfields. 
The CRG provides a robust airfield control capability, with the ability to operate during 
sustained long-term HADR deployments. However, the case studies showed that the 
CRG lacked its own organic airlift, making it reliant on supporting Air Force 
organizations for deployment, typically slowing the CRG response. AFSOF possesses 
organic lift while maintaining the capability to open airfields, making AFSOF a valuable 
rapid responder. Specifically AFSOF’s speed, organic C2, unique mission sets (see 
Appendix A), and relationships enable the priming of the disaster area until follow-on 
forces arrive. The case studies demonstrated AFSOF’s value particularly early in the 
HADR response; AFSOF’s best utility is in short duration operations. Other forces, such 
as the MEF and CRG are needed for long-term sustainment.  
This chapter concludes with recommendations for improving future AFSOF 
HADR operations that are almost certain to occur again. The thesis also includes an 
AFSOF Disaster Response CONOPS located in Appendix B.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following four recommendations provide a path for AFSOF to have a better 
response capacity in future HADR operations. 
First, USAID and DOD responders should have a common operating framework 
for HADR missions. As the lead agency for HADR operations, USAID controls the 
response. To this degree, the DOD should align its doctrinal definitions for HADR to 
mirror those of USAID. This action would put both the DOD and USAID on a common 
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understanding when a specific HADR term is used. To assist in addressing this issue, the 
USAID definitions used to respond to HADR operations, which differ from those of the 
DOD, are included in the AFSOF Disaster Response CONOPS in Appendix B. 
Furthermore, the DOD should adapt the Joint Publication (JP) 3–29 Foreign 
Humanitarian Assistance to align its definitions with USAID’s lexicon. 
Second, USAID and DOD should work toward greater interoperability before a 
HADR crisis occurs. Part of improving the process of interoperability is a more thorough 
understanding of the key players in an organization, along with educating various players 
on the capabilities of one’s own organization. The case studies revealed that AFSOF 
leaders received no or limited interagency training prior to engaging in HADR 
operations. However, given AFSOF’s penchant for creating and sustaining relationships, 
this should be a relatively easy barrier for AFSOF to overcome. Specifically, USAID’s 
Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) should be required for anyone placed in a 
leadership role during a HADR operation and recommended for all AFSOF members. 
USAID, through the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation, conducts this training 
regularly and worldwide. The various AFSOF wings and groups should coordinate with 
USAID to offer this training to their members, especially AFSOF assets located in the 
Pacific theater. Furthermore, AFSOF should provide a capabilities brief to the visiting 
JHOC team and provide additional briefs to improve USAID’s and other DOD rapid 
responders’ understanding of AFSOF capabilities. Finally, the JP 3–29 Foreign 
Humanitarian Assistance should include a more robust section on SOF, especially 
AFSOF and their unique mission sets. 
Third, AFSOF should work toward maintaining a habitual relationship with the 
humanitarian assistance community to prepare to support HADR missions. AFSOF 
training and skill sets are a natural fit for the capabilities needed in a HADR operation: 
working in an austere environment; the need for all weather capability; the ability to 
conduct 24-hour operations; the use of night vision goggles; ability to operate self-
sustained; and rapid employment at a moment’s notice. In order to utilize these skills, 
AFSOF leadership should foster a habitual relationship at the leadership and planning 
levels with USAID and other HADR forces. AFSOF has a limited understanding of the 
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needs of the humanitarian assistance community and, similarly, the humanitarian 
assistance community seems to have a limited understanding of AFSOF capabilities. 
Building relationships at the leadership level would help mitigate this problem.  
Given the critical information gaps presented in this paper, AFSOF should 
improve its interoperability with other agencies by ensuring the organizations who are 
leading the effort understand the unique capabilities that AFSOF can provide during the 
operation. A step toward rectifying the issue of a lack of knowledge between USAID and 
AFSOF is tabletop exercises. These exercises would provide multiple benefits to both 
AFSOF and USAID, along with any other organizations involved in the scenario. First, 
interoperability would improve through an understanding of capabilities worked out 
during a realistic scenario. Furthermore, if an agency or organization fails to fully 
understand other agencies’ capabilities (or an agency’s inability to accomplish a certain 
task), the players can discuss the limitations beforehand and develop work arounds, 
thereby preventing any issues that could arise in a real life situation. Given the small size 
of AFSOF and USAID, these exercises would foster relationships that would likely meet 
up in the field. Even if the exact individuals are not on scene during the disaster event, a 
network of people will begin to form to provide subject matter expertise or connections to 
the required information. These HADR tabletop exercises ideally should not be limited to 
AFSOF and USAID. Whenever possible and based on the situation exercised, the MEF 
and CRG should be included to improve interoperability with other DOD HADR rapid 
responders as well. 
The final recommendation is to improve AFSOF planning for a HADR event 
through the AFSOF Disaster Response CONOPS presented in Appendix B. This 
document prepares commanders and their staff to develop courses of action for an 
efficient response during rapid-onset foreign disaster relief operations. The CONOPS 
separates AFSOF’s response into four distinct phases: initial planning, time-critical life-
saving actions, disaster relief operations support, and handoff operations. 
The initial planning phase attempts to maximize the limited time available before 
the deployment of forces. As seen in the case studies, this timeframe can be robust 
through early warning detection (as seen in Operation Damayan), or it can occur in less 
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than 24 hours (as was the case in Operation Unified Assistance and Operation Unified 
Response). The initial planning involves creating a tailorable and scalable organic C2 
entity to manage AFSOF assets. This C2 construct should focus on intelligence 
preparation of the disaster area, focusing on identifying the best staging base and forward 
airfields to support the hub-and-spoke concept. Furthermore, leadership should work 
initial coordination with USAID and other DOD rapid responders, along with a lessons 
learned review of past HADR missions.  
The time-critical, life-saving actions phase begins as soon as AFSOF arrives in 
the disaster area, whether airborne providing surveillance support or after landing 
providing ground search-and-rescue capabilities with their special tactics teams. At this 
point in the disaster, there is limited C2, intelligence, and communication. AFSOF needs 
to link-up immediately with its DOD hierarchy, host-nation representatives, and the 
USAID DART. These players within HADR can generate rough initial needs 
assessments, allowing AFSOF to provide initial search-and-rescue operations and critical 
aid delivery. There are typically a number of relief gaps (lack of C2, communications, 
security, HADR expertise, etc.) that AFSOF members can fill until more robust forces 
arrive. This phase tends to last only a few days; however as new disaster areas become 
accessible this phase can reoccur. 
Concurrently, the third phase begins with disaster relief support. This phase 
focuses on integrating the movement and delivery of relief supplies. The goal should be 
to move away from pushing to outlying areas what is believed as necessary relief 
supplies, to the affected areas pulling the supplies actually needed through requests or 
needs assessments. This process requires a unity of effort from all organizations 
involved; no organization should make assumptions of humanitarian need on their own. 
AFSOF, in particular, should focus on opening forward airfields as part of the hub-and-
spoke concept and achieving a 24-hour operations window. AFSOF aircraft and 
personnel provide unique capabilities to partner with the host nation, international actors, 
or the DOD to enable 24-hour operations into often austere airfields.  
The fourth and final phase, handoff operations, involves AFSOF handing over 
control of airfields and airlift operations to larger DOD organizations or the host nation. 
 73
This is the goal of AFSOF operations in HADR events, and AFSOF leaders should plan 
for this ultimate goal. While AFSOF can operate in a non-SOF role, especially with 
regard to tactical airlift, this support should be limited once conventional forces arrive in 
the disaster area.  
The AFSOF Disaster Response CONOPS should be used during HADR 
operations; it should also be exercised and revised, as needed, to provide the most up-to-
date and accurate analysis of AFSOF utility in rapid-onset, natural disasters. Each of the 
recommendations above provides an opportunity should AFSOF wish to improve its 
HADR response capability. These efforts each require that the parties involved take 
action before a disaster strikes. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Rapid-onset natural disasters are difficult to prepare for, yet there will always be a 
need to assist those nations affected, and the United States will continue to be a major 
contributor to HADR operations around the world. AFSOF’s rapid-responder capabilities 
and relationships make it an excellent DOD asset for HADR missions by priming a 
disaster area for follow on forces and filling in relief gaps. While AFSOF’s personal 
relationships have supported its HADR operations in the past, its limited interaction with 
USAID, with other DOD rapid responders, and with the humanitarian assistance 
community have impacted the ability to apply its unique characteristics during HADR 
operations. History has shown that disasters are another guarantee in life and every day 
brings with it the possibility of “the next big one.” Should a disaster strike a foreign 
nation, it is likely the United States will lend a hand and AFSOF will be ready to support 
rapid-onset disaster relief to mitigate the loss of life and alleviate suffering. 
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APPENDIX A. AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 
CORE ACTIVITIES 
This appendix takes directly from “AFSOC Core Activities” an Annex to the 
Joint Publication 3–05 Special Operations. The case study titled “Information Operations 
in Recent Conflicts” was deleted from this Appendix. 
As an Air Force major command and the Air Force component to U.S. 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Air Force special operations 
forces (AFSOF) are responsible for providing the necessary capabilities to 
conduct or support these operations and activities. AFSOC refers to these 
capabilities as core missions. AFSOF conduct these core missions to 
support USSOCOM directed core activities and any other Secretary of 
Defense directed tasking. AFSOC core missions include: 
Agile Combat Support (ACS). [ACS is] the foundational and 
crosscutting core mission that enables all AFSOC operational core 
missions and capabilities of specialized air power: speed, lethality, and 
global perspective. It effectively creates, prepares, deploys, employs, 
sustains, and protects Air Force special operations Airmen, assets, and 
capabilities throughout the range of military operations. 
Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID). [AvFID] delivers [special 
operations forces] SOF combat aviation advisors necessary to assess, train, 
advise, assist, and equip partner nation aviation units in airpower 
employment, sustainment and foreign integration. AvFID is conducted 
through persistent, periodic, or episodic engagements with [partner 
nations] that facilitate advanced aviation employment and other aviation-
related functions such as security, airfield management, and aircraft 
maintenance. Mission capabilities are applied across the operational 
continuum with emphasis on combating terrorism, [foreign internal 
defense], unconventional warfare, and coalition support. [Combat aviation 
advisors] advise and assist [geographic combatant commanders], civilian 
agencies, and foreign aviation units on planning and integrating foreign 
airpower into theater campaign plans, contingencies, and other joint and 
multinational activities. [Combat aviation advisor] personnel [assess, train, 
advise, assist, and equip] foreign aviation combat and combat support 
units in aircraft maintenance, logistics, airbase defense, command and 
control, aeromedical support, personal survival, personnel recovery and 
other functions supporting combat air operations. [Combat aviation 
advisors] are aligned by flights to the different theaters, and [combat 
aviation advisor] personnel maintain a high level of garrison training and 
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readiness in order to deploy on short notice to any nation within the 
assigned theater. 
Command and Control (C2). [C2 is] the exercise of authority and 
direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached 
forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are performed 
through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, 
facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, 
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the 
accomplishment of joint/combined special operations. 
Information Operations (IO). [The AFSOC IO mission is] an integrated 
approach of information-related capabilities during military operations to 
influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries 
and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Executed in both a 
supporting and supported role, IO are predominantly non-kinetic 
capabilities creating effects in all domains to ensure information 
superiority. When effectively integrated into operations in the same 
manner as traditional capabilities, it provides friendly forces the ability to 
collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective 
opposition. The capabilities traditionally associated with IO are electronic 
warfare, military information support operations (MISO), military 
deception, and operations security. The purpose of MISO is to induce or 
reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator’s 
objectives. IO is successfully executed not by the employment of a single 
predetermined capability, but by identifying and using any combination of 
information-related capabilities necessary to achieve desired effects. 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). [ISR] 
synchronizes and integrates sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation 
and dissemination in direct support of current and future SOF operations. 
It consists of manned and remotely piloted aircraft and Distributed 
Common Ground Systems that deliver actionable intelligence to the SOF 
operator. ISR produces detailed, specialized products tailored to mission, 
customer, and pace of operation that gives SOF a decisive advantage 
against our adversaries.  
Precision Strike (PS). [PS] provides the [joint force commander] and the 
SOF operator with specialized capabilities to find, fix, finish, exploit, 
analyze and disseminate applicable targets. [Find, fix, finish, exploit, 
analyze and disseminate] can use a single weapon system or a 
combination of systems to fulfill elements of the kill chain. PS missions 
include close air support, air interdiction, and armed reconnaissance. 
Attributes associated with PS include unparalleled persistence, robust 
communications, superior situational awareness, precise target 
identification, lethality, and survivability.  
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Specialized Air Mobility (SAM). [The SAM core mission] includes 
specialized mobility and specialized refueling. Specialized mobility is the 
conduct of rapid global infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of personnel, 
equipment, and materiel using specialized systems and tactics. Specialized 
refueling is the conduct of rapid, global refueling using specialized 
systems and tactics, thereby greatly increasing mission flexibility and 
range. These missions may be clandestine, low visibility, or overt and 
through hostile, denied, or politically sensitive airspace using manned or 
unmanned platforms. Operations may be conducted with a single aircraft 
or as part of a larger force package and are normally conducted during 
periods of darkness. 
Special Tactics. [Special tactics] delivers highly specialized, combat 
proven capabilities to integrate, synchronize, and control air assets to 
achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Special Tactics 
personnel may be comprised of active duty, [Air Force] Reserve 
Component and Air National Guard forces, which may consist of combat 
controllers, pararescue, special operations weather teams, and tactical air 
control party. Special Tactics capabilities consist of air traffic control; 
assault zone assessment, establishment and control; terminal attack 
control; fire support; operational preparation of the environment; special 
reconnaissance; command & control communications; full spectrum 
personnel and equipment recovery; humanitarian relief; and battlefield 
trauma care. 284 
 
                                                 
284 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-05, Annex (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2014), last updated January 23, 2015, https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-05-
D06-SOF-AFSOC-CORE-MSN.pdf. 
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APPENDIX B. AFSOF DISASTER RESPONSE CONCEPT OF 
OPERATIONS 
This CONOPS establishes a baseline for the use of Air Force Special Operations 
Forces (AFSOF) in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) at the joint 
special operations air component (JSOAC) level. The influence for this CONOPS is the 
Navy Warfare Development Command tactical memo (TACMEMO) 3–07.6-06 Foreign 
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations Planning, which is a planning 
document for the Navy’s execution of HADR. Additionally, the CONOPS takes inputs 
from Joint Publication (JP) 3–05 Special Operations; JP 3–17 Air Mobility Operations; 
JP 3–29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; and Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures (TTP) 3–47 Contingency Response. This CONOPS provides commanders a 
roadmap for the initial response of rapid-onset natural disasters supported by AFSOF. 
There are five sections within this CONOPS: Initial Planning, Time-Critical Life-
Saving Actions, Disaster Relief Support, Handoff Operations, and United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) HADR definitions. The first four sections 
represent the four phases AFSOF should focus on during HADR, while the final section 
includes definitions to aid interoperability. The four phases are not necessarily in 
chronological order; time-critical life-saving actions, disaster relief operations support, 
and handoff operations can occur at multiple times or even simultaneously. Finally, these 
four phases are not all-inclusive; they provide bulleted guidance for commanders and 
their staff to use in planning for AFSOF-supported HADR operations.  
1. Initial Planning. Rapid-onset natural disasters leave little time for planning, 
allow for limited to no intelligence gathering, and require an almost immediate 
response to save lives. Furthermore, the alert and launch process further 
diminishes time available to provide assistance. This section focuses specifically 
on what is important during initial planning for HADR. 
1.1. Tailorable and Scalable JSOAC. The tailorable and scalable unit type 
code (UTC) of the 9AAHQ allows maximum flexibility for creation of the 
JSOAC. Expect limited to no support from host nation (HN) or U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) entities initially. The host-nation 
infrastructure may be destroyed and/or the larger DOD may not bring 
enough equipment to support AFSOF (communications, medical, 
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intelligence, civil engineering, supply, fuels, finance, contracting, public 
affairs, etc.). 
1.1.1. United Nations Clusters. USAID and the humanitarian assistance 
community organize themselves around eleven clusters: Health; 
Camp Management and Coordination; Emergency Shelter; 
Nutrition; Logistics; Sanitation, Water, and Hygiene; Education; 
Early Recovery; Emergency Telecommunications; Food Security; 
and Protection. The JSOAC should identify and bring specialists 
that can coordinate with these clusters. Those individuals who will 
interact with the humanitarian assistance community should bring 
civilian clothes for attending cluster meetings and stress the desire 
of AFSOF to assist in meeting the lead agency’s intent. Subject 
matter experts who can explain AFSOF’s unique capabilities 
should be used in the positions. See JP 3–29 Foreign 
Humanitarian Assistance, Appendix D for more information on 
Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Organizations. 
1.1.2. Size. The UTC used should base itself on size options: small, 
medium, large. The more unknown the operation, the larger the 
JSOAC should be with the ability to tailor down as information 
becomes available. 
1.1.3. JSOAC Staging. Attempt to co-locate the JSOAC with the HN’s 
relief hub while avoiding the joint task force’s (JTF) deployment 
location. This should place the JSOAC at less congested airfield, 
directly in contact with the HN, and able to use the local relief 
supplies that immediately arrive after a disaster versus U.S. 
supplies that must be flown in via strategic airlift. 
1.1.4. Disaster Response versus Contingency. Consider not using the 
term contingency for HADR as it implies combat and a mentality 
that does not conform to the intentions of a HADR operation. 
Additionally, attempt to limit the use of contingency gear: 
weapons, armor, helmets as able. AFSOF should present 
themselves to the disaster survivors as a helping organization 
versus an invading force. Coordination with the humanitarian 
assistance community should be done in civilian clothes as much 
as possible. 
1.2. Intelligence Preparation of the Disaster Area. The media is normally 
the fastest source of intelligence immediately following a disaster. AFSOF 
should focus requests for information (RFIs) primarily on identifying the 
placement of the JSOAC as a primary relief hub and then begin to identify 
additional airfields (from strategic airlift capable to austere) for forward 
relief spokes. Review airfield surveys for any limitations and attempt to 
submit waivers early for maximum capability in the future (instrument 
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meteorological conditions self-contained approach, runway condition, 
maximum effort aircraft operations, etc.). Anticipate a joint forces air 
component command commander (JFACC) to gain tactical control 
(TACON) of AFSOF aircraft, which could complicate airfield surveys and 
waivers in the future. 
1.3. Initial Coordination. Pre-established relationships are one of AFSOF’s 
best practices during disaster response. These networks allow AFSOF to 
rapidly respond in HADR. If AFSOF can arrive early through established 
relationships, it primes the area for the use of conventional DOD forces 
later on. Furthermore, connections made during the operation can set the 
stage for future cooperation. AFSOF should be presented as a HADR 
rapid responder to dispel any concerns about special operations myths. 
1.3.1. HN. AFSOF should use its connections with the HN to gain 
information on where to stage the JSOAC, where the relief 
supplies are located, where there is need for search and rescue or 
critical aid, and to help expedite country clearances. HN 
relationships can help keep AFSOF ahead of the declaration 
process. Local knowledge and intelligence is critical in 
understanding the disaster area before arrival. 
1.3.2. USAID and Humanitarian Community. USAID is the U.S. lead 
agency for HADR. It is best to have a point-of-contact before 
arriving at the JSOAC staging area. Additionally, cluster 
coordination should be done prior to departure via any 
communication means, including social media, such as Twitter, 
Facebook, Skype, etc. The humanitarian assistance community 
extensively uses social media; the UTC should include 2–3 
computers capable of using social media websites and not tied to 
DOD protections/firewalls. Additionally, consider setting up one 
of these computers at the home station Operations Center.  
1.3.3. JTF: MEF and CRG. The geographically located Marine 
expeditionary force (MEF) typically will establish the JTF, leading 
the DOD HADR response. It is best to establish a preexisting 
relationship with the MEF, prior to a disaster occurring. However, 
once a disaster occurs AFSOF leadership should make contact with 
the MEF in order to brief its leadership on AFSOF capabilities in 
case they are needed. Consider placing a liaison at the MEF. 
Additionally, attempt to make contact with the geographically 
located contingency response group (CRG) who will most likely 
be the DOD entity that will do hand-off with AFSOF for airfield 
control. Lastly, establish a coordinated mission statement, 
objectives, and end state with the JTF and its supporting agencies. 
Measures of effectiveness should not be based on pounds of cargo 
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moved, but on what AFSOF can provide to the overall HADR 
mission. 
1.4. Lessons Learned Review. Since AFSOF does not routinely exercise 
HADR missions, it is important that commanders and their staff review 
the latest lessons learned from AFSOF disaster response operations. 
Operation Unified Assistance, Operation Unified Response, Operation 
Tomodachi, and Operation Damayan provide excellent lessons learned for 
AFSOF to review in addition to this thesis and CONOPS. 
2. Time-Critical Life-Saving Actions. The inherent nature of disasters is that they 
require an immediate response. These immediate life-saving responses typically 
involve search and rescue, casualty evacuation, and the delivery of critical aid. 
This phase usually only lasts a few days, but as newly accessible disaster 
locations become available, AFSOF may revert to this phase of operations. The 
JTF-Forward is not always operational during this phase, so coordination through 
HN or USAID is crucial.  
2.1. Search-and-Rescue Operations. Search-and-Rescue operations are 
optimized with a ground force, air surveillance, and casualty evacuation 
capability. This capability can be included with the initial deployment 
mission to maximize response. Consider deploying a special tactics team 
with the advance team ahead of the JSOAC capable of supporting Search-
and-Rescue efforts. 
2.2. Critical Aid Delivery. Initial aid delivery typically uses “push” 
operations, without much analysis on the needs of the survivors. Those 
unsolicited supplies can quickly clog airfields and warehouses; 
additionally, there is usually very limited to no materials handling 
equipment (MHE) available at airfields, significantly delaying operations 
and limiting crew days. Attempt to limit critical aid to small packages that 
are easily hand offloaded or consider flying MHE onboard AFSOF 
aircraft. The various methods of combat offload can also be an excellent 
work around for delivering palletized supplies until MHE can arrive. 
Coordinate with special tactics teams for the best placement of relief 
supplies during this time to maximize ramp space and limit congestion. 
Additionally, reach out to the HN and USAID if possible to delineate 
critical items that need to be brought to the operation.  
3. Disaster Relief Support. This phase is where AFSOF will spend most of its time 
during operations. Disaster relief operations may continue after AFSOF 
redeploys. This phase is estimated to last approximately two weeks. The goal of 
this phase is to maximize support of the JTF’s objectives. 
3.1. Communicate and Integrate Response. AFSOF’s speed can put it ahead 
of the DOD’s coordinated effort. To mitigate this, AFSOF needs to align 
its rapid-responder capabilities with the JTF: speed, organic command and 
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control (C2), unique mission sets, and relationships should be leveraged to 
fill any gaps during the initial stages of the disaster response. 
3.1.1. HN Inclusion. While AFSOF expertise can be vital in HADR, the 
HN should always be put in the front of the operation and 
empowered to its utmost capacity. AFSOF should try to limit 
conducting operations that it will not be able to turnover to a 
replacement force or the HN. 
3.1.2. Liaison. AFSOF should limit redundancy and duplicated efforts 
while maximizing unity of effort. This occurs through liaisons 
established within the JTF in order to inform the DOD force of 
AFSOF’s capabilities and improve information sharing.  
3.2. Move and Deliver Aid. Supply chains need to be designed and deployed 
immediately. The Hub-and-Spoke scheme is an excellent tactic for moving 
relief supplies through the disaster area. Once in this phase, operations 
should change quickly from “push” orientation to “pull” focused. A needs 
assessment is critical to identify what supplies should go where; the Office 
of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) disaster assistance 
response team (DART) and the JTF should be prioritizing and 
communicating requirements, if not provide inputs. 
3.2.1. Hub-and-Spoke. The Hub-and-Spoke scheme of operations is 
clearly described in the JP 3–17 Air Mobility Operations. 
Additionally, the multi-service TTP 3–17.2/3-21.1B/3-02.18/3-
2.68 Airfield Opening details airfield opening, operations, and 
handoff. AFSOF should be proactive in identifying airfields to 
further this tactic and avoid single points of failure. Focus on 
airfields that will support strategic airlifters first, and then proceed 
to tactical airlift capable runways. AFSOF is most valuable during 
this phase by enabling 24-hour operations when other aviation 
elements are limited by lighting and electricity. Additionally, build 
forward area refueling point locations for helicopter and tilt-rotor 
refueling support. 
3.2.2. MHE. MHE is a significant weakness for initial operations for 
rapid responders. Delays in the delivery of MHE can significantly 
hamper time critical operations. Consider bringing more MHE than 
organic relief supplies. Due to AFSOF’s unique aircraft, they are 
more efficiently used to transport mission support equipment than 
flying relief aid initially to the disaster area. 
3.2.3. 24-Hour Operations. Special tactics teams and the unique mission 
sets of AFSOF aircraft support 24-hour operations at airfields in 
coordination with HN or other DOD aircraft. The goal should be to 
get a major hub-and-spoke to 24-hour operations as soon as 
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possible, and then handoff operations and move on to other 
airfields as coordinated with the lead agency. Consider using slot 
times to regulate the flow of traffic within the hub-and-spoke 
airfields, especially those with limited maximum on ground 
(MOG) capability or MHE. 
3.2.4. Airdrop. This is a last ditch effort in the humanitarian assistance 
community. If necessary, begin prepping the HN, USAID, and 
humanitarian community of its possibility as early as possible in 
order to avoid a public affairs backlash. Use the term aerial 
delivery, instead of airdrop due to the humanitarian community’s 
sensitivity with the term. USAID priorities are typically not 
logistical, but in empowering the HN to sustain its own distribution 
of relief and recovery aid. While airdrop can be extremely 
effective, if aid is left unattended with no formal distribution, it can 
create unwanted or dangerous effects. Field Manual 4–20.147/Air 
Force Technical order 13C7-37-31 details Humanitarian Airdrop. 
4. Handoff Operations. Due to limitations in AFSOF’s ability to sustain itself, 
seamless handoff coordination needs to be a focus of operations immediately. An 
example end statement is, “Assigned HADR operations handed over to designated 
U.S. forces, HN forces, international governmental organization, non-
governmental organization, and/or private organizations.” 
4.1. Airfield Handoff. The multi-service TTP 3–17.2/3-21.1B/3-02.18/3-2.68 
Airfield Opening provides airfield handoff checklists and situational report 
templates for transitioning from small team control to larger conventional 
air forces. 
4.2. C2 Handoff. The Air Force TTP 3–4.7 Contingency Response provides 
multiple checklists for use to transition forces during disaster response. 
4.3. Redeployment of Forces. AFSOF should start coordinating for its 
redeployment as soon as possible. AFSOF should be used to bridge DOD 
capability gaps and prime the disaster area for conventional forces; 
however AFSOF should limit its use in conventional roles. 
5. USAID Definitions. The following is a list of definitions that USAID uses that 
differ from the DOD, or the DOD does not use, during HADR operations. 
Reference Chapter II of this thesis for a comparison of the USAID and DOD 
definitions. 
Complex Emergencies: “Situations that develop because of or during a human 
conflict.”285 
                                                 
285 United States Agency for International Development, Field Operations Guide for Disaster 
Assessment and Response, F–2. 
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Disaster Relief: “Immediate, life sustaining assistance provided to disaster 
victims.”286 
Humanitarian Assistance: “Generally considered emergency assistance in life-
saving relief efforts.”287 
Natural Disasters: “Earthquakes, hurricanes, droughts, etc., and are not initiated 
by or involved in human conflict.”288 
Preparedness: “Activities undertaken in advance to ensure effective response to 
the impact of disasters.”289 
  
                                                 
286 United States Agency for International Development, ADS Chapter 251: International Disaster 
Assistance, 10. 
287 United States Agency for International Development, Joint Humanitarian Operations Course 
(JHOC) Workbook, 14. 
288 United States Agency for International Development, Field Operations Guide for Disaster 
Assessment and Response, F–2. 
289 Ibid., V–6. 
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